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Abstract

Throughout his fiction and nonfiction writings,
particularly in his narrative texts, D. H. Lawrence was

preoccupied with the human dilemma of realizing intimacy

with another while preserving individuality.

Late in his

career, Lawrence developed these explorations into a theory

of the unconscious and union in two essays—Psychoanalysis
and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious-—

claiming that the theory first evolved undeliberately from

his fiction and then was developed in the essays.
Traditionally, Lawrencian criticism has offered limited

examination of the essays, considering them as the primary
site of Lawrence's psychology theory and using them only to
explicate the fiction.

Conversely, some contemporary

studies have isolated the essays, examining only their

rhetorical style and structure without considering how the
essays relate to the fiction.

Reversing and expanding both

views, as well as disputing Lawrence's separation of the
essays from his fiction, this study instead Shows that
(1) the novel Women In Love was the narrative text in which

Lawrence began consciously and deliberately to develop his
psychology theory of the unconscious and union and

(2) Lawrence's tentative articulation of theory in the novel

developed into a more assertive and strategically developed

rhetoric of persuasion in the two essays.
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Introduction

D. H. Lawrence was a prolific writer whose works span
many genres, explore almost every conceivable topic, and

continue to generate an abundance of wide-ranging critical
responses.

However, in spite of the profusion of inquiry

into both his narrative and expository texts, a survey of
Lawrence scholarship and criticism quickly reveals that

commentators have devoted their time and attention primarily

to Lawrence's fiction.

They offer, usually, only a limited

examination of his nonfiction, exploiting it generally for
the purpose of explicating the fiction.

The nonfiction, for

most critics, becomes a window into Lawrence's narratives.

A case in point are Lawrence's two psychology essays.
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the
Unconscious:

[Critics] have been happy enough to pillage both
psychology books for resounding summaries of
Lawrence's ^beliefs' but, considering how much has
now been written on him, they have provided
comparatively little appraisal of their character or
worth and not much discussion of their relation to

his other writings.

(Ellis 69)

The purpose of my study is twofold.

,
First, I will

reverse this traditional approach by using Lawrence's
fiction to inform his nonfiction; specifically, I will show
that Lawrence's novel Women in Love was the text in which he

began to work out his psychology theories that later

appeared in the two psychology essays.

Second, I will

dispute Lawrence's own claim, made in his foreword to

Fantasia, that his psychology theories evolved unconsciously
from his fiction.

Lawrence called the novel form "the one bright book of

life" and "art speech," the only true speech.

He believed

that it was the task of the artist to develop this truth
through fiction, and that the sole purpose of the novel was
to convey^^

and effect change in its readers, not by

preaching, but by leading readers through a narrative

experience that would enlighten them. Jjowever, as
Lawrehce's narrative texts grew, so too did the didactic
assertions within his fiction, and by mid career, his
theories became more directly stated in his tales.

A case

in point is his novel Women in Love, which explores the
conflicting goals of preserving individuality—which he
called "spontaneous being" or the fully realized

"unconscious"—while maintaining an ideal intimate

relationship with another—which he called "union," "star-

equilibrium," or "polarity."
Some four to five years after completing Women in Love,

Lawrence presented his theory of the unconscious and union
in fully developed expository form in his two psychology
essays, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of
the Unconscious.

Here too Lawrence's bias for the novel

surfaces in his foreword to Fantasia where he explains that

his theories are inferred from the novel.

This pseudo-philosophy of mine - ^pollyanalytics', as
one of my respected critics might say - is deduced
from the novels and poems, not the reverse. The
novels and poems come unwatched out of one's pen.
And then the absolute need which one has for some
sort of satisfactory mental attitude towards oneself

and things in general makes one try to abstract some
definite conclusions from one's experiences as a

writer and as a man. The novels and poems are pure
passionate experience. These ^pollyanalytics' are
inferences made afterwards, from the experience.
And finally, it seems to me that even art is
utterly dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it,
on a metaphysic. The metaphysic or philosophy may
not be anywhere very accurately stated and may be
quite unconscious, in the artist, yet it is a

metaphysic that governs men at the time, and is by
all men more or less comprehended, and lived. . . .

Then it is unfolded into life and art.

{Fantasia,

"Foreword" 15)

Given Lawrence's "deducing" and "inferring," the
implication is that no direct claim has been made in his

fiction—hints maybe, or, to be very Lawrencian, knowledge
is gained from the whole experience of life in the novel.
Further, if the experience of the novel has come "unwatched

out of [Lawrence's] pen," the expectation is that he makes

no direct claims as novelist, as author of Women in Love,

and that his philosophy was quite unconsciously developed as
he was writing this novel.

By heeding Lawrence's admonition

to trust the "tale" and not the "teller," and by examining

Women in Love's

structure, its narration, and its dialogue,

this study will reveal many examples in which Lawrence was

consciously and deliberately articulating his theory of the
"unconscious" and "union" in this novel.

Also analysis will

show Women in Love to he an earlier st^9® of Lawrence's
conceptualization process: throughout the novel's text are
examples of Lawrence's theory in embryonic form.

Finally

the study will show the two psychology essays to be formal

expository statements fleshed out after, and probably as a
result of, the novel, which through its queries and answers

beGomes, in addition to a compelling fiction/ the

preliminary draft of Lawrence's psychology theory.
Ultimately both this novel and the psychology essays are
laden with Lawrence's gospel of the unconscious and union.

Background

Throughout his writing career, Lawrence was preoccupied

with the struggle between men and women attempting to
establish an intimate relationship but, at the same time,
struggling to preserve their individuality.

In his novels

and short stories, Lawrence continually explored and

recorded the quest for an ideal relationship, resulting
mostly in failed relationships and occasionally in those
unions whose success is left open to debate.

Even to the

beginning reader of Lawrence, his preoccupation with the
struggle in human relationships is yery evident and

compelling, particularly in his earlier writings where
Lawrence's powerful imagery allows readers to feel the

experience along with those characters engaged in the quest
for this ideal state.

By mid career, however, the voice of the author began
to intrude into his narratives, striving to find a solution
to the human dilemma of avoiding isolation while preserving
individuality.

Through both his characters and his

narrators, Lawrence began to talk out his ideas about why

relationships failed and how they could succeed.

He was

experimenting, exploring, and establishing his theory of
individuality and union.

This significant turning point for

Lawrence takes place in his mid-career novel Women in Love

(WIL hereafter).^ In this novel, relationships are not just

experienced; they are discussed over and over again by the
narrator and by the characters.

Most telling is Lawrence's

own recognition of his need to debate these issues in his

fiction.

In his Foreword to WIL, which was written in 1919,

two years after the completion of the novel, but published
separately from both the English and the American

publications of the novel, he explains:
This novel pretends only to be a record of the
writer's own desires, aspirations, struggles; in a
word, a record of the profoundest experiences in the
self. Any man of real individuality tries to know
and to understand what is happening, even in himself,
as he goes along. This struggle for verbal
consciousness should not be left out in art.

It is a

very great part of life. It is not superimposition
of a theory. It is the passionate struggle into
conscious being. (Phoenix II 275-276, emphasis
added)

Although the foreword was written some two years after
the novel, allowing Lawrence time to consider what he had
done and to identify his "struggle for verbal

consciousness,"he was, nevertheless/ aware of a change in
his writing much earlier on.

In a letter to Edward Garnett

dated 12 December 1913, Lawrence discusses his new novel-in

progress The Sisters (which later was split to become The

Rainbow and WIL), "It is very different from Sons and
Lovers:

written in another language almost. . . . 1 shan't

write in the same manner as Sons and Lovers again, 1 think—
in that hard, violent style full of sensation and

presentation" (Sagar 46, Lawrence's emphasis).

Then in May

of 1916 after beginning WIL, Lawrence referred to it as "a
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stranger to ine even as I write it" and "a sequel to The

RainJbow though quite unlike it" (Sagar 71).

In that same

month, he seemed to be reiterating what he was to express

later in his 1919 Foreword to WIL:

"I have got a long way

with my novel. . . . At present my real world is the world
of my inner soul, which reflects on to the novel I write"
(Sagar 71).

Besides Lawrence's own observations of the changes that
were occurring in his writing from Sons and Lovers to The
Rainbow and ultimately to WIL, the texts themselves offer

substantial illustrations of these changes, particularly WIL
which reveals a more self-conscious author and deliberate

■■

theorizer speaking through the narrator and the characters.
Lawrence also developed a new plot structure for WIL.

Never before WIL, nor after, did Lawrence juxtapose two
couples and their ensuing relationships as he did in this

novel.

Throughout, the reader is made aware of significant

differences between the couples, Ursula Brangwen/Rupert
Birkin and Gudrun Brangwen/Gerald Critch.

One couple—

Ursula and Rupert—represents the potentially ideal

relationship, while the other couple represents a failed

relationship.

Some critics argue that this interpretation

of Lawrence's couples as polar opposites is too simplistic a

notion and that WIL is too complex to be reduced to good
couple versus bad couple.

Indeed WIL is complex in its

structure, its characterization, and its ideas;

nevertheless, the novel does focus on the two couples and

its plot does trace the evolution of the two relationships.
Furthermore, by novel's end, one couple is clearly lost:
Gerald

and Gudrun remains directionless.

At the

same time, however, while the success of Ursula and Rupert's
relationship has been argued, many critics consider the
novel's ending too open to be a pronouncement of a
successful union.

In spite of this lack of resolution for Ursula and

Birkin, the possibility of realizing Lawrence's ideal union

is embodied in their discussions, although lacking in their
experience.

More important than the outcome of each

couple's relationship is consideration of what Lawrence did

with the two couples in the novel.

By using opposing

couples in this way for the first time, Lawrence was

exploring the causes of success and failure in relationships
in an attempt to develop a theory of ideal union.

He was

moving a step beyond observing and recording relationships
as experience in the way that he had already done in Sons
arid Lovers and The Rainbow.

In WIL, he was beginning to

speculate and to theorize about how to achieve the ideal

relationship and how to avoid the destructive one, but he

did not resolve these issues by novel's end.

of resolution is important.

This absence

WIL as text is engaged in

exploration and speculation, not resolution. Lawrence did

hot realize his ideal union through Ursula and Birkin in his

fiction; he could only express it as theory through their
dialogue, through his narrator, and ultimately, in his later
psychology essays.

Talk is the essence of WIL.

Beyond the couples' actual

experiences—what they did and how they did it—most

significant is their dialogue—especially the dialogue
between Ursula and Birkin as they struggle to define the
ideal union that they are both seeking.

For Lawrence,

Ursula and Birkin's dialogue becomes the primary site of his
exploration, his "struggle for verbal consciousness."
Lawrence had never done this before.

Never had his couples

self-consciously and intellectually sought an ideal
relationship, nor had a couple ever before engaged in
deliberate discussion of what it is they seek in their
union.

Both Sons and Lovers' and The Rainbow's couples

struggle with relationships, but they do not talk about it

in the same way (in fact they hardly talk about it amongst
themselves) nor is their goal the same.

In both of these

novels the protagonists, Paul Morel in Sons and Lovers and
Ursula Brangwen in The Rainbow, seek a rite of passage, and

the relationships that they experience along the way end up
contributing to their coming of age.

As a result, whatever

discussions they do engage, in regarding the relationships
come afterwards and seem to be more reflective, showing a

growing awareness of who they are and who they are becoming.

Ursula and Rupert/ on the other hand, talk throughout WIL
about their desires, and these discussions precede both
consuininatiori and inarriage.

The dialogues from the earlier

novels pale in comparison to the garrulous conversations in

which WIL's Couples engage, particularly Ursula and Rupert.
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Chapter One
From Love Talk to Theory

The "Do you love me?" dialogue is a staple in
Lawrence's narratives, particularly in WIL, and for most
readers this dialogue would not be considered an uncommon

prelude to an intimate encounter, or following it for that
matter.

However, Lawrence uses it for much more than

narrative unfolding^

The love dialogue between Birkin and

Ursula becomes a forum for Lawrence's evolving theory of

ideal union, a place where he works his ideas out through
the couple's questioning of one another and their debating
the issue of love.

And as they talk, Birkin and Ursula

conceptualize together.

Gudrun and Gerald's love dialogues,

on the other hand, are far less garrulous than Birkin and
Ursula's and far less theoretical as well.

Gerald and

Gudrun usually have their talks after a physical encounter,

while Ursula and Birkin discuss love long before they have
had any kind of physical relationship.
Such stark differences between the couples can be

misleading and can tempt readers to judge these couples as
either successes or failures.

While there is no doubt that

Gerald and Gudrun's relationship fails in the novel, Ursula

and Birkin's is open to debate, and critics have continually
argued the success of Ursula and Birkin's relationship.
can make a case for either view.

m

One

However, the purpose of my

study is not to judge the success or failure of the
relationships themselves, but rather to demonstrate that

Laurence was working out his theory through these couples
and their dialogue.

Ultimately his novel culminates in

paradox rather than resolution.

My analysis is not directed to the novel as a resolved

entity in itself, but as one stage in Lawrence's development
of a theory that finally found its expression in the essays.

Although Gudrun and Gerald's relationship is more clearly a
failure than Ursula and Birkin's relationship, the latter
couple's relationship does not lead to the ideal theory of
union that Lawrence articulates in the essays.

However,

their dialogues do mark the initial steps leading to this
ideal theory.
By the time Ursula and Birkin have their first

discussion in "An Island" chapter, it is clear that they
have more than a casual interest in one another, but there
have been no physical demonstrations of affection between

them.

Their opening exchange is indicative of a search for

something more, a desire to find meaning in their lives.

Birkin's initial response to Ursula's inquiry about his
health demonstrates this search: "one is ill because one

doesn't live properly—can't.

It's failure to live that

makes one ill, and humiliates one."

Ursula responds

immediately with a question, "But do you fail to live?"

A

few lines later Birkin explains, "But it infuriates me that
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I can't get right, at the really growing part of me. . . . I

don't know what really to do.

One must do something

somewhere," to which Ursula retorts, "Why should you always
be doing? . . . It is so plebian.

I think it is much better

to be really patriGian, and to do nothing but just be
oneself, like a walking flower" (125, Lawrence's emphases)i
This early exchange sets the pattern for Ursula's role

as interlocutor in these dialogues, which some critics claim

is Lawrence's way of interrogating his novel and its
message.

Jackson and Jackson define this role played by

Lawrence's female characters as "a counterpoint, a

corrective view"(34), and Cowan calls it "a practical and

realistic view that functions as a corrective" (171-172).
However, Ursula's role is not only to balance Birkin; she
tog is searching:

"Ursula often wondered what else she

waited for. . . ^ Sometimes she had periods of tight horror,
when it seemed to her that her life would pass away, and be
gone, without having been more than this" (52).
From these personal concerns the dialogue quickly turns

to the topic of love, but it is the global implications of

love with which Birkin is concerned:

"And they say that

love is the greatest thing . . . the foul liars. . . . the

millions of people who repeat every minute that love is the
greatest, and charity is the greatest—and see what they are

doing all the time" (126-127).
love, counters:

Ursula, the spokesperson for

"But . . . that doesn't alter the fact that
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love is the greatest, does it?

What they do doesn't alter

the truth of what they say, does it?" (127, Lawrence's

emphasis).

Ursula's tag questions form another pattern in

her dialogues with Birkin.

"Frequently Ursula will provide

a succint rejoinder to his verbal outburst, a teasing and
deflating remark by her which reveals his characteristic

wordiness and imprecision" (Balbert 88).

As she counters

with her view, she is inviting him to continue the dialectic
and to explain himself further.

The discussion continues taking only two pages for
Ursula to steer it to a more immediate level:

"But . . .

you believe in individual love even if you don't believe in
loving humanity-?" (129).

Birkin's response is not so

strange; he believes that love is just an emotion, not the

end-all and be-all of human relationships.

Neither is

Ursula's an unusual view; she believes that the emotion of

love is the essential bond in a relationship.

To this point

the discussion is a credible exchange between two thoughtful
people with opposite views, but it is neither esoteric nor

didactic.

Birkin is looking for new direction; he wants

something more, but just what, he's not sure.

*One must throw everything away, everything—let
everything go, to get the one last thing one wants,'
he said.

^What thing?' she asked in challenge.
^I don't know—freedom together,' he said.
She had wanted him to say ^love.' (132)

Birkin's "I don't know" is explored throughout the

14

novel as he and Ursula talk, attempting to develop a notion
of love, of relationships, of individual personal

development.

Birkin's "freedom together" is the core of

Lawrence's ideal union, later to be called "star

equilibriiim" by Birkin in the novel and finally by Lawrence

in the essays.

Ursula's view of personal engagement through

love is contrary not only to Birkin's "freedom together,"
but also to Lawrence's theory of impersonal union in
essays, especially as it is expressed in Fantasia:

the

"[Every]

individual creature shall come to its own particular and
individual fullness of being. . . . through a living dynamic
relation to other creatures. . . . not the relation of love

(182, Lawrence's emphasis).

Contrasting the some ten pages that comprise Ursula and

Birkin's first love discussion in "An Island" chapter is
Gerald and Gudrun's first love talk of less than a page,

which is far more concrete and immediate.

Following

Gudrun's frenzied dancing and taunting of the bulls, she
defies Gerald's attempt to stop her.
strikes him on the face.
he exclaims.

They argue; she

"You have struck the first blow,"

"And I shall strike the last," she retorts

(171).^ Following this terse exchange and Gudrun's pleas
that Gerald not be angry, the first mention of love between
them occurs, rather a sudden juxtaposition to such a brutal

dialogue:

"I'm not angry with you.

(171).
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I'm in love with you"

This open declaration of love is the first mention of

the word between these two; there have been no lencfthy
abstract discussions like Ursula and Birkin's preceding
Gerald's statement.

Not only has Gerald and Gudrun•s first

physical encounter been a violent one, but it has also
served, ironically, as an introduction to Gerald's

declaration of love.

Even more telling is GudrUn's

facetious reply (or is it disbelief?):

putting it."

"That's one way of

Next he checks with her, "It's all right,

then, is it?" and she acknowledges with "Yes, it's all
right" (172).

Their first love talk extends four bridf

lines ^^hardly a discussion, and a far cry from the breadth
of inguiry that marks Birkin and Ursula's first verbal
encounter on love.

on the one hand, thrdugh Biirkin and Ursula's dialogue,
Lawrence demgnstrates a search for some kind of truth

through love, for some kind of Salvation through love--a way
to succeed in the quest for an ideaT relationship.

On the

other hand, through Gerald and Gudrun's limited dialogue,
Lawrence is demonstrating failure to achieve this kind of a

perfected relationship by their lack of inquiry, by their

moving ahead without thinking, without examining each other,

without conceptualizing, without debating.
In Lawrence's extremes there is paradox.

Ursula and

Birkin work so hard to formulate a theory that their mental
efforts inhibit physical and emotional union for quite some
16

time.

While Gudrun and Gerald forge directly into physical

union, they act without giving any thought to what it is
they are doing with each other.

One couple is too submerged

in theorizing their potential union; the other literally
doesn't know what they're doing.
Furthermore, the paradox is extended in the essays

where Lawrence bids readers to abandon the mental realm by
submitting to their preverbal unconscious and to impersonal
union, yet, he appeals to the reader^s intellect, giving
verbal directives on how to achieve this ideal state.

In

his fiction these two opposing psychological states are

irreconcilable.

Instead, each of WIL's couples represents

only one side of Lawrence's theoretical view—either Gudrun

and Gerald's primal approach or Ursula and Birkin's mental

analyzing—but neither can embody his theory in full nor can
they find balance between these two extremes, a balance
necessary to achieving Lawrence's ideal union.

Although these initial love dialogues reveal much about
how each of the two couples approaches their relationship,

it is in the "Mino" chapter that Birkin and Ursula's
dialogue begins to formulate Lawrence's theory of human

relationships.

The"Death and Love" chapter, conversely,

via Gudrun and Gerald's "Do you love me?" dialogue, serves

as the counterpart to the "Mino" chapter showing this
couple's impending demise.

different patterns.

Each couple's encounter follows

For Ursula and Birkin"Mino" begins
■ ■ 17 ■

, .

with dialogue and ends with embrace.

For Gudrun and Gerald

"Death and Love" begiris with an embrace, followed by
dialogue and ultimately by consummation.
immediate need is different.

Each couple's

One must talk and talk before

acting; the other must do without talk.

"The two relations,

Gerald-Gudrun and Birkin-Ursula, intertwine throughout the
book but represent wholly opposed experiences.

If the

latter is a dream of becoming, the former dramatizes coming
apart" (Moynahan 67).

Moynahan's "dream of becoming"

signifies potential-—not resolution—a potential theory that
Lawrence gives shape to in the essays, but never fully
realizes in WIL.

By the second page of the "Mino" chapter after some

preliminary small talk, Birkin gets right to the point:

"if

we are going to know each other, we must pledge ourselves
forever.

If we are going to make a relationship, even of

friendship, there must be something final and infallible

about it," and in response to Ursula's lack of response, he
continues:

"I can't say it is love I haye to offer—and it

isn't love I want.

It is something much more impersonal and

harder,—and rarer" (145)

interaction ensues:

From this point a lengthy verbal

a series of questions by Ursula and

assertions by Birkin.
'You mean you don't love me?' [Ursula]
[narration omitted]

'Yes, if you like to put it like that.—Though
perhaps that isn't true. I don't know. At any rate,
I don't feel the emotion of love for you—no, and I
don't want to. Because it gives out in the last
18
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;

issues.' [Birkin]
'Love gives out in the last issues?' [Ursula;
narration omitted]
'Yes, it does. At the very last, one is alone,
beyond the influence of love.

There is a real

impersonal me, that is beyond love, beyond any
emotional relationship. So it is with you. But we
want to delude ourselves that love is the root.

isn't.

It is only the branches.

It

The root is beyond

love, a naked kind of isolation, an isolated me, that
does not meet and mingle, and never can.' [Birkin]
LiiaxidUJ-Uii omitted]
uillxuLfciUJ
[narration
'
And you mean you can't
't love?'
1
• [Ursula;
tttt-ru T a •
'And
narrati
nn omitted]
omi
i
narration
'Yes if you like—I have loved. But there

beyond where there is no love.' [Birkin]
[narration omitted]

'But how do you know—if you have never really
loved?' [Ursula]

'It is true, what I say: there is a beyond, in
you, in me, which is further than love, beyond the
scope, as stars are beyond the scope of vision, some
of them. • [Birkin]
'Then there is no love,' [Ursula]

'Ultimately, no, there is something else.
ultimately, there is no love. • [Birkin]

But,

[narration omitted]
'Then let me go home'—-what am I doing here?'
[Ursula]

'There is the door > . . You are a free agent. •
[Birkin]
[narration omitted]

'If there is no love, what is there?• [Ursula;
narration omitted]

•

'Something,' [Birkin; narration omitted]
'What?' [Ursula]

[narration omitted]
'There is,' he said, in a voice of pure
abstraction, 'a final me which is stark and

impersonal and beyond responsibility.

final you.

So there is a

And it is there I would want to meet you

-not in the emotional, loving plane—but there
beyond, where there is no speech and no terms of
agreement. There we are two stark, unknown beings,
two utterly strange creatures, I would want to
approach you, and you me. - And there could be no
obligation, because there is no standard for action

there, because no understanding has been reaped from
that plane. It is quite inhuman,—so there can be nc
calling to book, in any form whatsoever— because one

is outside the pale of all that is accepted, and
nothing known applies. One can only follow the

impulse, taking that which lies in front, and
responsible for nothing, asked for nothing, giving
nothing, only each taking according to the primal
desire.' (145-146, Lawrence's emphases)
There is nothing in this exchange to startle readers.

Birkin is insisting on a particular kind of relationship,
although he is not completely clear on how to achieve this,
while Ursula wants Birkin simply to declare his love to her.

Indeed Birkin's assertions are rather lofty and impersonal
as a prelude to intimacy, and it is unclear to the reader as

well as to Birkin what exactly it is that he wants.

"Something," his one—word response to Ursula's questioning
about what should replace love, and his long speech that
follows both demonstrate his attempt to articulate his

vision.

Although this early recital has not yet reached the

theoretical stage that the psychology essays will later
take, it exemplifies Lawrence's "struggle for verbal
consciousness" in the novel, and it serves as a prelude to
Lawrence's discussion of love found in Fantasia:

It is time to drop the word love, and more than time
to drop the ideal of love. Every frenzied individual
is told to find fulfilment in love. So he tries.
Whereas, there is no fulfilment in love. Half of our

fulfilment comes through love, through strong,
sensual love.

But the central fulfilment for a man

[or a woman] is that [each] possesses his own soul in

strength within him, deep and alone. The deep, rich
aloneness, reached and perfected through love and the
passing beyond any further quest of love. (123,
Lawrence's emphasis)

Love is a spontaneous thing, coming out of the
spontaneous effectual soul.

As a deliberate

principle it is an unmitigated evil.

(79)

[Every] individual creature shall come to its own
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particular and individual fullness of being. . . .
through a liying dynhniic relation to other
creatures. . . . not the relation of love.
Lawrence's emphasis)

(182,

Lawrence's discourse in the essays is further developed
than Birkin's words to Ursula.

Birkih does not want to lose

himself in a love relationship in his encounter with Ursula,
and it is this fear that underlies his aigument, din thd
essays, however, Lawrence clearly identifies the darigers of

this kind of encompassing love and adamantly denounces its
practice.

Lawrence's ideas begin to take shape through

these verbal explorations that Birkin takes with Ursula.

The following stage of Ursula and Birkin's lengthy

dialogue reveals a pattern of equivocation by Birkin as
Ursula insists on his declaration of love and an explanation
for his position of non-love.

Like Lawrence, Birkin's

rhetoric is strong and affirmative when he is asserting
without interruption his beliefs, but he is not so
comfortable when called upon to explain his claims or to

enter into a dialogue.

The following rhetorical hedging

resembles a rhetorical pattern in parts of Fantasia where
Lawrence is called to defend his first treatise.

Psychoanalysis

(discussed in ch. 3 below, pp. 76-77 and

endnote 13).

4

^But it is because you love me, that you want

me?' [Ursula]

'No it isn't. It is because I believe in you—
if I do believe in you.' [Birkin]
'Aren't you sure?' [Ursula]

[narration omitted]
'Yes, I must believe in you, or else I shouldn't
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be here saying this,' he replied. "But that is all
the proof I have. I don't feel any very strong
belief at this particular moment.' (147, Lawrence's
emphasis)

Birkin's "if I do believe in you" and his "I must
believe in you" reveal his discomfort when Ursula insists
that he prove himself to her.

He is comfortable when

discussing his ideas as general theory, but not so

comfortable when asked to apply these views specifically to
himself and to their relationship.

Birkin's fear of

personal and emotional connection with another often limits

him to the solitariness of his own thoughts, thoughts which,
according to Miko, serve paradoxically as "both doctrinal
revelation" and "a mask for his own inadequacy" (247-248).
The defensive posture, the hedging, and the biting voice
that sometimes emerge in Birkin's responses to Ursula's

challenges parallel Lawrence's rhetorical responses in
Fantasia to critics' indictment of Psychoanalysis, his first
essay.

Both Birkin and Lawrence struggle to find words that

fit the idealism they espouse, and they both hide behind
words to cover their discomfort and uncertainty.
Next when asked by Ursula, "But don't you think me

good-looking?", he evades answering her question directly by

claiming, "I don't feel that you're good looking."
playing with words:

He is

She wishes to know if he perceives her

to be physically attractive, and he hedges by changing
Ursula's "think" to "feel."

And when she pushes him by
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asking "Not even attractive?", he still cannot give a
straightforward answer, but instead responds with a tirade

on the topic of physical attraction:

"Don't you see that

it's not a guestion of visual appreciation in the least?
. . . I don't want to see you.

I've seen plenty of women,

I'm sick and weary of seeing them.
see" (147, Lawrence's emphasis).

I want a woman I don't

In such examples, Birkin's

words create "an irony that even approaches humor" (Miko

248):

Birkin begins by questioning Ursula's ability to

understand, "Don't you see," and ends with an indictment
against himself, "I don't see."

A few lines later he

continues:

I want to find you, where you don't know your
own existence, the you that your common self denies
utterly. But I don't want your good looks, and I
don't want your womanly feelings, and I don't want
your thoughts nor opinions nor your ideas—they are
all bagatelles to me. (147)

Birkin's hedging, his self-righteousness, and most of
all, his long-winded rhetoric become tiresome to Ursula:

think you are very silly.

"I

I think you want to tell me you

love me, and you go all this way round to do it" (148).
However, Ursula's interrogation of Birkin does not always
function as the "corrective view" that Jackson and Jackson
and other critics have claimed.

Sometimes she is

manipulating and pushing Birkin towards her view of love.

Indeed Widmer's speculation that Birkin's "wilful arguing of
the doctrine" develops into what he calls an "adversarial
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eroticism" (137) between these two is particularly
noteworthy here.

Throughout the novel talk predominates,

and these dialogue scenes are especially indicative of
Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness" operating in
and through this couple, especially through Birkin.

"In

Women in Love the stage is often left to Birkin to ^try to
know and understand' this *passionate struggle', [sic] and
his accompanying ^struggle for verbal consciousness' is

necessarily . . . often contradictory, evasive, and inexact"
(Balbert 88).

Other characters besides Ursula criticize Birkin for

his verbose, didactic posturing with such epithets as "word
bag" and

"preacher."

Both Birkin's evasion and his

inflated rhetoric parallel the Lawrence voice that we hear

in his psychology works, particulary in Fanatasia when
Lawrence is defending his first essay. Psychoanalysis,

against the critics.

Lawrence was aware of his own problem

of garrulousness and alluded to it repeatedly:

In a letter

to Edward Garnett (18 February I9I3), Lawrence expresses his

dismay, "I wish, I were not so profuse - or prolix," and
earlier he writes, "[Trim] and garnish my stuff I cannot 

it must go" (Sagar 32 & 35). Perhaps Lawrence is parodying
his own verbosity through Birkin and others.
In spite of his overblown rhetoric and his

defensiveness, Birkin's "I want to find you, where you don't
know your own existence, the you that your common self
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denies utterly" (see above p. 23) is most significant as it
provides the kernel for Lawrence's preverbal pristine
unconscious later defined in the psychology essays.

In

Psychoanalysis, Lawrence develops Birkin's idea to the full:
We have actually to go back to our own unconscious.
But not to the unconscious which is the inverted

reflection of our ideal consciousness [a mental
construct].

We must discover, if we can, the true

unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior
to any mentality. . . . innocent of any mental
alteration, this is the unconscious. It is pristine,
not in any way ideal. It is the spontaneous origin
from which it behooves us to live.

It is not a shadow cast from the mind.

It is the

spontaneous life-motive in every organism.

(212)

And in Fantasia, Lawrence continues to explore the

implications of his unconscious theory as it pertains to
relationships:

It is the death of all life to force a pure idea into
practice. Life must be lived from the deep, selfresponsible spontaneous centres of every indiyidh^^
in a vital, non-ideal circuit of dynamic relation
between individuals. The passions or desires which
are thought-born are deadly. (85, Lawrence's
emphasis)

Although Birkin's explanation to Ursula is not as

informed as Lawrence's, he begins his exploration of the
unconscious and union when he rejects Ursula's "good looks,"
her "womanly feelings," her "thoughts," opinions," "ideas"—
what Lawrence calls "egoism" or mental consciousness in the

essays.

And Birkin embraces Lawrence's "pristine

unconscious" as the pathway to union with Ursula.

Yet, at

the same time, he denies Ursula the very selfhood that

Lawrence's "pristine unconscious" promises, when he rejects
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her thoughts/ opinions, ideas, feelings.

Both Birkin's

limited articulation of these concepts and the contradiction

inherent in his responses to Ursula exemplify Lawrence's
"struggle for verbal consciousness" in the novel.

Indeed

there is irony and paradox in the couple's exchange when
considering it in the light of Lawrence's theory of
preserving one's "pristine unconscious" in "a vital non-

ideal circuit of dynamic relation between individuals"
{Fantasia 85).

In concluding this dialogue, Birkin is able finally to
get to the point and tell Ursula what he wishes their

relationship to be:

"What I want is a strange conjunction

with you . . . not meeting and mingling;—you are guite
right:—but an equilibrium, a pure balance of two single
beings:—as the stars balance each other
added).

(148, emphasis

This is the first direct statement in the novel

that approximates Lawrence's theory of union as it was to be
expressed later in the two psychology essays.

In

Psychoanalysis Lawrence explains:
For the end, the goal, is the perfecting of each
single individuality, unique in itself - which cannot
take place without a perfected harmony between the
beloved, a harmony which depends on the at-last

clarified singleness of each being, a singleness
equilibrized, polarized in one by the counter-posing
singleness of the other.

The one process, of unison, cannot go on without the
other process, of purified severance. (222, emphasis
added)

Ultimately the star-equilibrium concept is the crux of
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's vision and Lawrence's own theory of the unconscious

and union as expressed in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.

By

the end of this dialogue, Birkin clearly and succinctly
suminarizes this theory:

is cpnunitted.

"[It] is the law of creation.

One

One must conunit oneself to a conjunction with

the other——forever.

But it is not selfless—it is a

maintaining of the self in mystic balance and integrity—
like a star balanced with another star" (152).

And in his

psychology essays, Lawrence elaborates on Birkin's

"maintaining of the self in mystic balance and integrity":
There is as well the continuing widening gap.

A

wonderful rich communion, and at the same time a

continually increasing cleavage.

If only we could

realize that all through life these are the two

synchronizing activities of love, of creativity.
(Psychoanalysis 221-222)

There are two ways of love, two ways of activity in
independence.

And there needs some sott of

equilibrium between the two modes. (Fantasia 46)
[The] whole circuit is established between two

individuals . . . neither is a free thing-unto-itself
. . . the very fact of established polarity between
the two maintains that coirespondence between the
individual entity and the external universe which is
the clue to all growth and development.
(Psychoanalysis 227)

By this point in the dialogue, even a novice or casual
reader of Lawrence would begin to find Birkin's
pronouncements esoteric and intrusive to the novel's world

of everyday experience.

Even though some readers would not

necessarily make the connection to his essays, they would

fully recognize the novel's vacillation from theory to
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experience:

What Lawrence's characters think and say about
themselves and their fate remains . . . the very
stuff of narrative, not of exposition. Nevertheless,
an examination of the language in which their
: obseryations are phrased will at once reveal, their
remarks are at the same time calculated theoretical

and formal statements.

(Friedman 44)

His characters, specifically in this case, Rupert
Birkin, cannot resist the temptation to preach and to move
beyond experience.

Clearly Birkin is wearing two hats:

he

is the man pursuing Ursula as well as the spokesman
advocating Lawrence's theories.

"[He] is the Lawrence-

fi&ure, that is to say, the author embodied in his own work,
but objectively embodied and integral to the work and not a
mere mouthpiece" (Spilka 121).

This is certainly not the case with Gerald, or with
Gerald and Gudrun as a couple.

They are not interested in

lofty, probing discussions about what it is that they are
doing; they are not interested in examining themselves as
individuals or as ^ couple in the way that Ursula and Birkin

are driven to do.

Their rather brief dialogue—one page in

"Death and Love" versus Ursula and Birkin's several pages.in
"Mino"—reflects their lack of awareness.

To Gudrun's "Are you happier?", Gerald responds, "Much
better. . .and I was rather far gone [from his father's

death]."

Ursula continues, "I'm so glad if I help you," and

Gerald, "Yes. . . There's nobody else could do it, if you
wouldn't."

One more brief comment by Gudrun, and then the

28

key question, "But how much do you care for me?"

Gerald

retorts "How much!. . .1 don't know either - but

everything," and Ursula, "But I can't believe it" (329,
Lawrence's emphases).

There is no common ground here for

discussion; they are unable to find a mutual issue like
Ursula and Birkin's love on which to debate.

"love" does not enter this discussion.

The word

Gerald's further

reply conveys their preoccupation with the here and now,

with the concrete needs that make up this relationship.
Why don't you believe it?—It's true.

It is

true, as we stand at this moment . . . I care for

nothing on earth, or in heaven, outside this spot
where we are. And it isn't my own presence I care
about, it is all yours. I'd sell my soul a hundred
times—but I couldn't bear not to have you here. I
couldn't bear to be alone. My brain would burst. It
is true.

(330)

Gerald's dependence and Ursula's skepticism are again

displayed in their next dialogue in this same chapter when
Gerald sneaks into her bedroom seeking relief from his pain.
In less than two pages, Gudrun asks the same question four

times:

"Why have you come?";

"And what do you want of me";

"What do you want of me?"; "But why did you come to me?"
Gerald, in response to her, explains:

"I wanted to"; "I

came—because I must"; and finally, "Because—it has to be
so.—If there weren't you in the world, then I shouldn't be

in the world, either" (343, Lawrence's emphasis).
this exchange, the relationship is consummated.

Following

No more

words are exchanged other than Gudrun's repeated insistence
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that Gerald "must go" (347) before her family rises in the

morning.

Their departure consists of an abrupt "Good-bye

then" from Gerald; a reciprocal "Good-bye" from Gudrun; arid
the narrator's accompanying description, "He kissed her,
dutifully, and turned away" (348-349).
Gerald and Gudrun's dialogues do not reflect the

conceptual exchange that Ursula and Birkin's dialogues do.
Instead of exchange, Gerald and Gudrun are "in opposition"
(WIL 177 & 329) as they speak.

Gudrunts skepticism cancels

any hope of union between them, and Gerald's need for Gudrun

to fill his inner void cancels any possibility for their
realizing the individuality that "star equilibrium"
promises.

The dependence that Gerald expresses in these

dialogues is extended into their ensuing consummation where
his needs not only consume Gudrun but also relfect his lack
of selfhood.

They cannot function as "two single beings" in

"a strange conjunction"^ (WIL 148). Instead they experience
a fusion that denies selfhood, as their ensuing consummation
corroborates the problems that their dialogues have shown
(to be discussed in the next chapter below).

Not only has the word "love" not been used by Gerald

and Gudrun in "Death and Love" where they consummate the

relationship, but the topic of love is not broached by them
until the novel's end in "Snowed Up" long after the
relationship has been consummated. By then, the tone is

cynical and the dialogue destructive.
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Gudrun opens the

discussion abruptly with a

and Geraid returns with

another question—a pattern that continues.
'How rauch do you love me?' [Gudrun]
[narration omitted]
'How much do you think I do?' he asked.
'I don't know,' she replied.
'But what is your opinion?' he asked.
[narration omitted]
'Very little indeed,' she said . . .
'Why don't I love you?' he asked. . .

you.

V*! don't know why you don't—-I've been good: to
You were in a fearful state when you came to

me.'

[narration omitted]
, 'When was I in a fearful state?' he asked.

'When you first came to me.

I had to take pity

on you.—But it was never love.'

[narration omitted]
'Why must you repeat it so often, that there is

no love?' he said . . . (442, Lawrence's emphasis)
After this initial fencing, Gudrun gets down to the

business of whether Gerald actually loves her.

Four times

in a very brief space of text (not quite a third of a page)
she repeats the question:

"Well you don't think you love,

do you?" (note the missing "me"); "You don't think you can
love me, do you?"; "You know you never have loved me, don't
you?"; "You know all right that you have never loved me.

Have you, do you think?" (442, Lawrence's emphases).

Once

Gerald evades the question by debating the semantics of
love, but twice he gives her a solemn, one-word

pronouncement of "No" (442).

The next question erases hope:

"And you never will love me . . . Will you?"

Again Gerald

says "No" (442, Lawrence's emphasis).

From accusation and despair, Gudrun moves to her pleas
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of "Say you loye me . . . Say you will love me for ever
—won't you—won't you?" and "Won't you say you'll love me

always? . . . Say it, even if it isn't true—say it Gerald,

do" (443).

After Gerald concedes with "I will love you

always," Gudrun retaliates with "Fancy your actually having
said it" and "Try to love me a little more, and to want me a
little less" (443).

The single most important dialogue between them
ironically repeats the many arguments over love that
precede Birkin and Ursula's marriage. For Gerald and
Gudrun, however, it is a retrospective look back at
at what has been wanting, a dialogue held too late
and almost forced out of its two victims. . . .

. . . it is the ultimate failure of verbal

consciousness, where language is simply a deliberate
act of will, an act of aggression . . . (Ragussis
215)

Furthermore it illustrates the kind of love relationship
that Lawrence warns about in Fantasia:

We think that love and benevolence will cure

anything. Whereas [they] are our poison, poison to
the giver, and still more poison to the receiver.
Poison only because there is practically no
spontaneous love left in the world. It is all will,
the fatal love-will. . . . only deadly, exaggerated
volition. (80, Lawrence's emphasis)

Ursula and Birkin, in spite of their theorizing and
conceptualizing in dialogue, have similar needs; Ursula
wants a declaration of love from Birkin, while he seeks

union with her.

By the end of '"Mino," Birkin finally breaks

down, becomes vulnerable, acquiesces to Ursula, and abandons
his theoretical ideals.

Whether he believes in love or not

is beside the point; he longs for her, for union, for
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consummation.

Their closing dialogue shows him weairing

down, and after all "the chatter, they finally embrace.
She put her arms around his neck.

He enfolded

her, and kissed her subtly, murmuring in a subtle
voice of love, and irony, and submission:
^Yes,—my love, yes,—my love.

Let love

be enough then.—I love you then—I love you.
I'm bored by all the rest.'

■Yes, ' she murmured, nestling very sweet and
close to him.
(154)

Both Gudrun and Ursula have coaxed and cajoled their

lovers, but only Ursula has been successful in winning the

desired admission of love from her partner.

However, by

giving in to Ursula, Birkin's words and actions betray his
ideal of impersonal union.

In spite of this momentary

compromise, Birkin continues to intellectualize the process

with his "But I want it to be something else" and his
"Because we can go one better" (154).

Birkin never gives up

his verbal quest for the ideal union, and throughout the
novel he strives to define this ideal, but his actions here

do not meet his ideal of star equilibrium nor do they meet
the ideal union that Lawrence defines in the essays.
Thus it seems that if words are incapable of
effecting that ^strange conjunction' that Birkin
wants, still some part of him that relies on words
must assert itself before that other part, which is
capable of passion, can come into being. In this
sense, the thinking speaking self liberates the
passionate self. (Bonds 108)
Whether Birkin's passionate self has been liberated

here is certainly questionable, although he does momentarily
experience this passionate liberation in "Excurse" when he
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and Ursula finally consummate their relationship (to be

discussed below in the next chapter).

More significant,

however, is Bonds"s point that for Birkin talk is the
prerequisite to passion and union.

He cannot avoid this

stage on his quest for an ideal union.

Finally Lawrence

completes Birkin's verbal task by composing the theoretical
formulations of Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.

Indeed the notion that one couple's relationship is
successful and the other is failed is simplistic.

Neverthless, Lawrence uses the Ursula/Birkin dialogues and
the Gerald/Gudrun dialogues to illustrate opposing views of
relationships as a means of exploring the concept of an

ideal union.

"[His] theories . . . are purged and qualified

by the pull and thrust of human interchange—and this is
Lawrence's way of threshing out important problems" (Spilka
6).

The primary obstacle to Lawrence's achieving resolution
in the novel is, of course, the classic conflict between
theory and practice, between the absoluteness of the ideal

versus the limitations of real life experience.

succinctly captures Lawrence's conflict:

Schneider

Lawrence, "the

religious artist wants a heroic soul," but Lawrence, "the
psychologist [the realist], aware of inner weakness,
indecision, and continual vacillation, can find little in

life to correspond to his vision" (193).

Although readers

of the novel may be left dissatisfied with Ursula and
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Birkin's relationship, their dialogues, when considered in

the light of the essays, become revealing and informing, as
they offer readers a view of an earlier stage of Lawrence's
theory of the unconscious and union.

And what most enriches

the thoughts and dialogues of WIL is their exploratory
nature:

Lawrence had not yet reached the conclusive stand

he was to take in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia, nor had he
reached the absolutist position of his later novels.

As

Lawrence himself points out in his Foreword to WIL, he was
engaged in a "struggle for verbal consciousness."
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Chapter Two
The Narrator as Theorist

Narration includes both editorial commentary and plot

development, and it is not unusual that the narrator of WIL
used both aspects of narration in the novel.

Neither

authors nor their narrators are immune to their own points
of view, nor should writers be expected to separate

themselves from their theories when they are writing.

Besides using Rupert Birkin's character and the love

dialogues to convey his view of relationships in WIL,
Lawrence also used WIL's narrator as a spokesperson to

convey his theory of individual development through union.
In this novel, the narrator's editorial commentary, for the

most part, is not disturbing.

Most of the time, the

narrator summarizes characters' inner states and the

condition of the developing relationships in ways that
enhance the tale and one's reading of it.

However, at other times, the narrator's voice intrudes

upon the narrative experience and becomes blatantly
didactic.

At these times, the narrator's rhetoric is lofty

and esoteric, and the jargon obtrudes.

Although in such

cases readers who are unfamiliar with the psychology works

would not recognize that the jargon and theory being

expressed by WIL's narrator parallel views expressed in the
nonfiction texts, the sudden shift in tone and voice is
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nevertheless obvious.

The narrator's rhetoric becomes most

stilted when Lawrence's psychology theories are being
expressed more consciously and directly within the novel.

At these times Lawrence's "struggle for verbal
Gohscioushess" is most acute.
Sometimes the narrator vacillates from moderate

narrative commentary to sudden didactic statements within a
short block of text, in some cases even within the confines

of a single paragraph.

More often, though, Lawrence

juxtaposes paragraphs, sharpening the contrast between these
two aspects of narration.

Two chapters, "Sunday Evening"

and "Man to Man," offer some striking examples of such
narrative juxtaposition, the former dealing with Ursula's
responses and the latter with Birkin's.

"Sunday Evening"'s

opening paragraphs offer a description of Ursula that is

perfectly acceptable within the context of the unfolding
plot.

As the day wore on, the life-blood seemed to ebb

away from Ursula, and within the emptiness a heavy
despair gathered.

Her passion seemed to bleed to

death, and there was nothing.

She sat suspended in a

state of complete nullity, harder to bear than death.
''Unless something happens, • she said to herself,

in the perfect lucidity of final suffering, 'I shall
die.

I am at the end of my line of life.'

She sat crushed and obliterated in a darkness
that was the border of death. She realised how all

her life she had been drawing nearer and nearer to
this brink, where there was no beyond, from which one
had to leap like Sappho into the unknown. The
knowledge of the imminence of death was like a drug.
Darkly, without thinking at all, she knew that she
was near to death.

She had travelled all her life

along the line of fulfilment [sic], and it was nearly
concluded.

She knew all she had to know, she had

ejcperiencea all she had to experience, she was

fulfilled in a kind of bittef ripeness, there
remained only to fall from the tree into death. And
one must fulfil [sic] one's development to the end,
must carry the adventure to its conclusion. And the
next step was over the border into death. So it was

then!

There was a certain peace in the knowledge.

After all, when one was fulfilled, one was

happiiest^ in falling into death, as a bitter fruit
plunges in its ripeness downwards.

Death is a great

consummation, a consummating experience. it is a
development from life. That we know, while we are
yet living. What then need we think for further?
One can never see beyond the consummation. it is
enough that death is a great and conclusive
experience. Why should we ask what comes after the
experience, when the experience is still unknown to

us? Let us die, since the great experience is the
one that follows now upon all the rest, death, which
is the next great crisis in front of which we have
arrived. If we wait, if we balk the issue, we do but
hang about the gates in undignified uneasiness.

There it is, in front of us, as in front of Sappho,
the illimitable space. Thereinto goes the journey.
Have we not the courage to go on with our journey,
must we cry ^I daren't.'? On ahead we will go, into
death, and whatever death may mean. If a man can see
the next step to be taken, why should he fear the
next but one?

Why ask about the next but one?

the next step we are certain.
death.

Of

It is the step into

(191-192)

Other than the narrator's overly dramatic references to

death and the shift from the personal "she" to the

impersonal "one" toward the end of the third paragraph, the
information regarding Ursula's despair in the first three
paragraphs serves reasonably as narrative explication.

However, the paragraph that follows moves beyond Ursula and
becomes the narrator's dissertation on death as the ultimate

consummation.

This distinct pronominal shift in the fourth

paragraph from "one" to "we" creates significant changes in

rhetorical tone.

Clearly the narrator has stepped to the
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podium and overtaken the text.

The movement in paragraph three from the statement "she

was fulfilled in a kind of bitter ripeness, there remained

only to fall from the tree into death" to the following "And

one must fulfil one's development to the end" appears as a
reasonable shift by the narrator from reporting to

reflecting.

This movement is neither too abrupt in tone nor

too didactic in its assertion.

But by the fourth paragraph/

the voice of the narrator has altered dramatically from
reflection—"when one was fulfilled one was happiest in

falling into death"—to pronouncement—"Death is a great
consummation. . . . That we know" (191).

The strong

assertive voice that rises from these pages in the novel
where the instructive first person "we" is used is

reminiscent of the same powerful voice of conviction that

Lawrence uses when making his pronouncements of theory in
Psychoanalysis's text (to be discussed below in ch.■3).
Besides the rhetorical shift from the first three

paragraphs to the fourth, the narrator's presentation of
death itself takes a considerable turn from the concrete—

Ursula's personal desolation in the first three paragraphs—^
to the abstract—death as "a great . . . consummsating
experience" in paragraph four.

That there is a void in

Ursula's life is clear at this point in the novel.

She has

neither come into her own "spontaneous being" nor realized
an eguilibriated union with another.
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The real topic here is

life, not death.

It is a definition by negation; the

absence of life within brings death.

In the novel, Lawrence

first must study those who suffer this inner death before he

can expound in the psychology texts on how to live life.

And by the time of the essays, Lawrence is not discussing
death.

Instead, he talks of life, a life that "must be

lived from the deep, self-responsible spontaneous centres of
every individual, in a vital, non-ideal circuit of dynamic
relation between individuals" {Fantasia 85).
The hopeful view of death—death as renewal or rebirth

—in paragraph four plays a different role:

the narrator is

talking about death of the ego, about death to the self, and
in this way anticipating Ursula and Birkin's consummation in
the "Excurse" chapter where for a moment they surrender ego

and will to the "great consummating experience."

Although

life, not death is the predominant topic of the psychology
essays, Lawrence first had to explore the actual experience

of death within his characters before he could postulate his

theory of life in the essays—his theory of the unconscious
and union.

And Ursula and Birkin become the seekers long

before the essays are ever formulated.

Also noteworthy are Ursula's directly guoted thoughts
and the narrator's references to her, intermittently

dispersed throughout these narrative pronouncements.
Examples of such narration are found in paragraphs that

follow those that have been quoted:
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"Her thoughts drifted

into unconsciousness, she sat as if asleep" and^^'In a kind
of spiritual trance, she yielded, she gave way" (192).
Whether this is Lawrence's way of keeping readers wed to the
story, or whether he wants readers to believe that

eyerything in these passages represents Ursula's point of

view and not the narrator's--that the narrator is simply ■
conveying it all~can never be known.

What can be concluded

with certainty, however, when examining such examples from
the novel, is that the narrator often intruded with strong
didactic pronouncements, some of which reiterate the

theories expressed in the psychology books.
Whether such excerpts represent Ursula's thoughts or

the narrator's, it is nevertheless clear that Ursula, like
Birkin, is searching for something more.

Yet her search is

not so ambitious as Birkin's nor are her answers so

definitive, except that when it comes specifically to her
relationship with Birkin, love is the prime requisite for

her.

Birkin, on the other hand, presents a more elaborate

theory of relationships, and always the Gortditiohs for union
move far beyond love itself.

Birkih's views fesemble those

of Lawrence in the psychology essays, and often the narrator
offers extended discussion of these views on Birkin's
behalf.

"Man to Man," the chapter that follows Ursula's "Sunday

Evening," not only repeats the pattern of "Sunday Evening"
with its shifts from narrative development to didactic
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pronouncements, but "Man to Man" also reveals the narrator's

reiteration of the relationship themes found in the

pSycliolb^ works^.^^^ This chapter opens: quite like "Sunday

f

Eyening," only this time Birkin'senriui is being described.
As Ursula's responses open "Sunday Evening," so too do

i

Birkih's open "Man fo Man,"with a brief description of

:

Birkin in paragraph one ahd a lengthy critique of
traditional marriage in paragraph two.
He lay sick and unmoved, in pure opposition to
everything. He knew how near to breaking was the
vessel that held his life, He knew also how strong
and durable it was.

And he did not care.

Better a

thousand times take one's chance with death, than
accept a life one did not want.

But best of all to

persist and persist and persist for ever, till one
were satisfied in life, (emphasis added)
He knew that Ursula was referred back to him.

He knew his life rested with her.

But he would

rather not live than accept the love she proffered.
The old way of love seemed a dreadful bondage, a sort
of conscription. . . . (199)
"Man to Man"'s first paragraph directly parallels

"Sunday Evening"'s first paragraph:

both describe the

breakdown in each character; both are in line with the
narrative movement; and both consider death as an

alternative.

However, there is one exception:

"persist"; he cannot give in.

Birkin must

It is Birkin's task to find

the ideal relationship, to formulate a theory, and
ultimately to realize his—and Lawrence•s—"struggle for
verbal consciousness."

He continues his quest in the next

paragraph with a lengthy critique of traditional marriage

and love (not fully cited above).
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From Birkin's original

attack on marriage in thg secoi|d;|^

"Man to Man,"

the text continues to vacillate between criticism and
Splution.

■
On the whole, he hated sex, it was such a
limitation. It was sex that turned a man into a
broken half of a couple, the woman into the other

broken half.

And he wanted to be single in himself,

the woman single in her self. He wanted sex to
revert to the level of other appetites, to be
regarded as a functional process, not as a

fulfilment.

He believed in sex marriage.

But beyond

this, he wanted a further conjunction, where man had
being and woman had being, two pure beings, each
constituting the freedom of the other, balancing each
other like two poles of one force, like two angels,
■

or two demons.

He wanted so much to be free, not under the

compulsion of any need for unification, or tortured

by unsatisfied desire. Desire and aspiration should
find their object without all this torture, as now,
in a world of plenty of water, simple thirst is
inconsiderable, satisfied almost unconsciously. And
he wanted to be with Ursula as free as with himself,
single and clear and cool, yet balanced, polarised
with her. The merging, the clutching, the mingling
of love was become madly abhorrent to him. (199-200)
The first of these paragraphs succinctly summarizes
Lawrence's theory of individual development via the

unconscious and via union with another, specifically in its
last sentence, "But beyond, he wanted further conjunction,
where man had being and woman had being, pure beings, each

constituting the freedom of the other. . . ."

is simple and its syntax direct.

Its language

The phrases "balancing

each other like two poles of one force" and "single and
clear and cool, yet balanced, polarised" echo Birkin's

theory of eguilibrium in "Mino" and anticipate Lawrence's in
Psycoanalysis and Fantasia.
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The narrator is reiterating Lawrence's theories, but

more significantly the narrator does so through Birkin's
thoughts, and it is Birkin's fear of merging and Birkin's
desire to preserve individuality for himself and for Ursula

that is the main concern in these two paragraphs.

in

PsychpanalysIs Lawrehce extends Birkin's concerns by
elabprating on the dangers of fusion and the neGessity of
preserving individuality in relationships.
Lawrence had to first btihg t

However,

ideas to"verbal

conpciouenesS'' through Birkin and the narrator before he

could articulate his theory in Psychoanalysis:
A soul cannot come into its own through that love
alone which is unison. If it stress the one mode,
the sympathetic mode, beyond a certain point, it
breaks its own integrity, and corruption sets in in

the living organism. On both planes of love, upper
and lower, the two modes must act complementary to
one another, the sympathetic and the separtist. . . .
The goal of life is the coming to perfection of
each single individual. This cannot take place
without the tremendous interchange of love from all
the four great poles of the first, basic field of

consciousness.

There must be the twofold passionate

flux of sympathetic love. . ; . And there must be the

twofold passional circuit of separatist realization,

the lower, vital self-realization and the upper,
intense realization of the other. . . . (240-241,
Lawrence's emphasis)

In the two "Man to Man" paragraphs previously cited,

unlike the "Sunday Evening" section on death, the narrator's

voice is not as stilted, the discussion is not as lofty, nor
is the jargon as foreign to the reader's ear.

Also, these

paragraphs are more readily acceptable as Birkin's thoughts

than is the narration acceptable as Ursula's thoughts in
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"Sunday Evening" because Birkin habitually carries on
verbally in this way.

Nevertheless, these issues are not

only Birkin's issues; they anticipate the psychology books.

Yet in spite of the more down^tb'-earth tone and language in
these fitst two pages of "Man to Man," the narrator cannot

resist the temptation to elevate his rhetoric, closing this
beginning reflection with two veri^ose paragraphs.
And why? why should we consider ourselves, men
and women, as broken fragments of one whole. It is
not true. We are not broken fragments of one whole.

Rather we are the singling away into purity and clear
being, of things that were mixed. Rather the sex is
that which remains in us of the mixed, the
unresolved. And passion is the further separating of

this mixture, that which is manly being taken into
the being of the man, that which is womanly passing
to the woman, till the two are clear and whole as

angels, the admixture of sex in the highest sense
surpassed, leaving two single beings constellated
together like two stars.

In the old age, before sex was, we were mixed,

each one a mixture. The process of singling into
individuality resulted in the great polarisation of
sex. The womanly drew to one side, the manly to the
other. But the separation was imperfect even then.
And so our world-cycle passes. There is now to come
the new day, when we are beings each of us, fulfilled

in difference.

The man is pure man, the woman pure

woman, they are perfectly polarised.

But there is no

longer any of the horrible merging, mingling selfabnegation of love. There is only the pure duality
of pblarisation, each one free from any contamination
of the other; In each, the individual is primal, sex
is subordihate, but perfectly polarised. Each has a
single, separate being, with its own laws. The man
h^^^
hers. Each acknowledges
the perfection of the pblarised sex-circuit. Each
admits the different nature in the other. (200-201)

The first person "we" has emerged again in conjunction

w^

voice of didacticism.

Lawrence's readers are being

ihstructed in these two paragraphs, not so much by Birkin as
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by the narratori

Although the ideas are Birkin's> the tone

and the voice are more a^

The "pure duality of

polarisation/" also referred to as star equilibrium by
Birkin in "Mino," is continually reiterated here in contrast

to the "merging, the clutching, th# m.ingling of ldve" whi
Birkin thinks a page earlier is "madly abhorrent to him."
This idea is central to Lawrence's theory of the unconscious
and union as it is expressed in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.
Lawrence tells "us" readers in Fantasia that "[we] either
love too much, or impose our will too much, are too
spiritual or too sensual," and he admonishes "us" readers
"to learn to live from the centre of our own own

responsibility only, and let other people do the same" (47).
In keeping with Birkin's concern for preserving the
individual-—"pure" manhood and "pure" womanhood—in
relationships, Lawrence extends the discussion in Fantasia:

But even in its profoundest, and most elemental
movements, the soul is still individual. . . . And

though we have a potential dynamic sexual connection,
we men, with almost every woman, yet the great
outstanding fact of the individuality even of the
blood makes us need a corresponding individuality in
the woman we are to embrace. (174 & 175)
H. M. Daleski succinctly captures the union that Lawrence,

Birkin, and the narrator have been wrestling with verbally:
"The relationship is envisaged as a meeting on equal terms
of two people who have themselves achieved full

individuality and transcend their duality in the balance
that is attained between them" (107).
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Overall, this three-page discussion can be accepted as

Birkin's as it reflects the issues he has been grappling
with in his dialgoues with Ursula.

At the same time, the

discussion can be accepted as Lawrence's because it

anticipates the ideas later expressed in the essays.
Nevertheless this entire section of the novel is expressed
directly in the narrative voice and not in Birkin's.

And in

an effort to preserve narrative credibility and flow, the
narrator closes this section with a reminder that these are

Birkin's thoughts we have been privy to just before Gerald's
arrival~"So Birkin meditated Whilst he was ill. . . . and

things came to him clear and sure" (201).

In contrast, when

concluding the "Sunday Evening" meditations just before

Birkin arrives to see Ursula, the narrator does not directly
assign these meditations to Ursula:
and quite forgotten. . . .

"Ursula sat quite still

gone into the ultimate darkness

of her own soul" (194).

As a meditative chapter, "Man to Man" offers yet
another vivid example of how WIL serves as an explorative

beginning to the psychology theories expressed in the
essays.

The union that both Lawrence (in the psychology

essays) and Birkin (in the novel) are seeking must be
eternal and impersonal, but not controlling—not "The

merging, the clutching, the mingling of love" which is

"madly abhorrent" to Birkin^ (200).

Such a union must

represent a balance between the "sympathetic" and
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"separatist" modes that Lawrence contrasts in Psychoanalysis
(cited abp:^ev p• 44)V

Uitimatelyy,, it is in the two

consuramatioh Ghapters, "Excurse" and "Death and Love,"that
the narrator illustrates, through Ursula/Birkin and
Gerald/Gudrun, the contrasts between an impersonal union and
a smothering union.

The narrator's judgment of each couple's relationship

is revealed early in these chapters in descriptions of each
partner, and later, in descriptions of their consummation.
In "Excurse," Birkin and Ursula are described as reborn
creatures whereas in "Death and Love" Gerald and Gudrun are

described as doomed creatures.

Birkin "was as if born out

of the cramp of a womb" (311), "as if he had just come
awake, like a thing that is born, like a bird when it comes
out of an egg, into a new universe" (312), and Ursula "was
beautiful as a new marvellous flower opened" (313), "an

essential new being . . . quite free . . . in complete ease,
her complete self" (314).

Spilka's observation that

Lawrence saw sex "as a religious communion, an inclusive

expression of the force of life itself, which nourishes and
renews the true self, the second ego, the individual soul of
each of the lovers" (216) is evident in the narrator's

description of Ursula and Birkin.

It is important to note

again that Lawrence searches for his ideal union through
Ursula and Birkin, and that although they do not meet his

ideal by novel's end, they do momentarily experience his

"religious communion" in the "Excurse" chapter.

Lawrence

further stresses his vision of an ideal union by the
contrasting fatal union between Gerald and Gudrun.

The promise of new life in "Excurse" starkly opposes
the fatal descriptions of Gerald and Gudrun in "Death and

Love," the fpilowing chapter.

Gudrun "felt as if she were

caught at last by fate, imprisoned in some horrible and

fatal trap," (325), and only three pages later, we are told

that "She died a little death" (329); "She sipped the

poison" (329).

As for Gerald, "A dangerous resolve formed

in his heart. . . . He would not go back tonight till he had
come to her, if it cost him his life.

He staked his all on

his throw"^ (339).
Along with the juxtaposition of chapter pairs, Lawrence
uses parallel structural patterns within these chapters to

illustrate the contrast between the two couples.

Besides

the initial character descriptions in "Excurse" and "Death
and Love," two intimate encounters are experienced by each
couple in each chapter.

By chapter's end each couple

realizes full consummation in the second encounter.

Ursula

and Birkin's first physical intimacies occur at the

Southwell inn, with their consummation under the night sky

in the open, natural setting of Sherwood Forest; conversely,
Gerald and Gudrun begin their embraces under a bridge while

walking home and consummate their relationship in the
stifling, secretive confines of Gudrun's bedroom.

The first paragraph that describes Ursula and Birkin's

coming together in the parlor of the inn identifies a
transition for them from continuous discussion to a non

verbal, felt experience.

He stood on the hearth-rug looking at her, at
her face that was upturned exactly like a flower> a
fresh, luminous flower, glinting faintly golden with
the dew of the first light. And he was smiling
faintly as if there were no speech in the world, save
the silent delight of flowers in each other.
Smilingly they delighted in each other's presence,
pure presence, not to be thought of, even known.
(312-313)

Not only have Ursula and Birkin moved beyond their
"Struggle for verbal consciousness,"they have entered a new

realm, the realm of the unconscious, where knowledge exists
at a level bdybnd mental consciousness--where reality need
not be articulated.

This becomes the essence of the

unconscious as it is defined in the first essay.
Psychoanalysis.
By the unconscious we wish to indicate that essential

unique nature of every individual creature, which is,
by its very nature, unanalysable, undefinable,
inconceivable. It cannot be conceived, it can only
be experienced. (214)
From the unconscious to the body centers, which are

also defined in the psychology essays, the novel moves on to

describe their physical meeting.
She traced with her hands the line of his loins

and thighs, at the back, and a living fire ran
through her, from him, darkly. It was a dark flood
of electric passion she released from him, drew into
herself. She had established a rich new circuit, a
new current of passional electric energy, between the
two of them, released from the darkest poles of the
body and established in perfect circuit. It was a
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dark fire of electricity that rushed from him to her,
and flooded them both with rich peace, satisfaction,
[brief dialogue omitted]

She closed her hands over the full, rounded body
of his loins, as he stooped over her, she seemed to
touch the quick of the mystery of darkness that was
bodily him. She seemed to faint beneath, and he
seemed to faint, stooping over her. It was a perfect
passing away for both of them, and at the same time

the most intolerable accession into being, the
marvellous fulness of immediate gratification,
overwhelming, outflooding from the Source of the
deepest life-force, the darkest, deepest, strangest
life-source of the human body, at the back and base
of the loins.

. . . She had thought there was no source deeper
than the phallic source. And now, behold, from the

smitten rock of the man's body, from the strange
marvellous flanks and thighs, deeper, further in
mystery than the phallic source, came the floods of

ineffable darkness and ineffable riches.

(313-314)

The significance in these paragraphs is not the

sensuality of Birkin's loins as Ursula connects with him,
but her discovery of "the deepest life-force. . .of the
human body, at the back and base of the loins" and the "rich

new circuit" that has been established between them,

according to the narrator, a "perfect circuit" (314).

All

that Lawrence may appear to be doing here is glorifying and

elevating Ursula and Birkin's union; however, he is doing
much more.

"His interest in sexual relations is most

fundamentally an interest in extending their meaning, not a

mere fascination with their intensity" (Miko, Intro. 10).
And for Lawrence in the novel, Birkin and Ursula become a

means of exploring the possibility for ideal union, the

ideal union that he defines more explicitly in the essays.
In these paragraphs from "Excurse," Lawrence begins to
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experimfent with the concept of body centers as critical

connections between two people; then from a biological
perspective in the psychology essays, Lawrence begins his
necessary effort to establish scientific credibility for

this theory of "equilibrium."

The following excerpt from

Fantasia defines the four primary body centers, according to
Lawrence, our "first field of dynamic consciousness":

The solar plexus and the lumbar ganglion, great
nerve-centres below the diaphragm, act as the dynamic
origin of all consciousness in man, and are

immediately polarized by the other two nerve-centres,
the cardiac plexus and the thoracic ganglion above
the diaphragm.

At these four poles the whole flow,

both within the individual and from without him of

dynamic consciousness and dynamic creative

relationship is centered.® (103)
None of the preceding citations that describe Ursula

and Biirkin's first meeting discuss directly the unconscious
or the body centers, yet the descriptions of the couple's
experience reveal Lawrence's early examination of these
concepts unfolding first in WIL before they are discussed in
the essays.
Far more concrete and far less mysterious is Gerald and

Gudrun's initial physical encounter in "Death and Love."
So, under the bridge, they came to a standstill,

and he lifted her upon his breast.

His body vibrated

taut and powerful as he closed upon her and crushed
her, breathless and dazed and destroyed, crushed her
upon his breast. Ah, it was terrible, and perfect.
Under this bridge, the colliers pressed their lovers
to their breast. And now, under the bridge, the
master of them all pressed her to himself! And how
much more powerful and terrible was his embrace than

theirs, how much more concentrated and supreme his
love was, than theirs, in the same sort!
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.

She felt

she would swoon, die, under the vibrating, inhuman
tension, of his arms and his body—^she- would pass
away. Then the unthinkable high vibration slackened
and became more undulating,- he slackened and drew her
with him to stand with his back to the wall.
She was almost unconscious. So the colliers'

lovers would stand with their backs to the walls,
holding their sweethearts and kissing them as she was
being kissed.—Ah, but would their kisses be fine and
powerful as the kisses of the firm-mouthed master?
Even the keen, short-cut moustache—the colliers

would not have that.

(330-331)

The language is more violent and overpowering here, and
there is no indication of connection, of a "rich new

circuit."

In this excerpt Gerald's power—his "taut and

powerful" body (330), "the ffrm-mouthed master" (331)—and
his conquest over Gudrun are detailed.

And Gudrun is

enamored of Gerald's external status, "the master of them

all" (330). Lawrence defines their relationship in
Fantasia: "It is all will, the fatal love-will. . . . There

is now only deadly, exaggerated volition. . . .We want to

put all life under compulsion" (80-81, Lawrence's emphasis).
There is no balance, no equilibrium between these two.

There isn't even the "horrible mingling" and "merging" that
Birkin has condemned.

Instead, Gudrun is overtaken, is

consumed by Gerald.

His arms were fast round her, he seemed to be

gathering her into himself, her warmth, her softness,
her adorable weight, drinking in the suffusion of her
physical being, avidly.

He lifted her, and seemed to

pour her into himself, like wine into a cup.

(331)

Unlike the violent interaction and the isolation of
Gerald and Gudrun's embrace, unlike their "balance . . . in
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opposition" (329), the narrator describes a potentially
ideal union between Birkin and Ursula that is reminscent of

Birkin's quest in "Mino" for a relationship with Ursula like
"two single equal stars balanced in conjunction" (151).
Also, this description by the narrator anticipates the
consumination that is to take place between Ursula and Birkin
a page later.

She sat in a fullness and a pure potency that
was like apathy, mindless and immobile. She was next

to him, and hung in a pure rest, as a star is hung,
balanced unthinkably.—-Still there remained a dark
lambency of anticipation. She would touch him. With
perfect fine finger-tips of reality she would touch

the reality in him, the suave, pure, untranslateable
reality of his loins of darkness.

To touch,

mindlessly in darkness, to come in pure touching upon
the living reality of him, his suave, perfect loins
and thighs of darkness, this was her sustaining
anticipation.
And he, too, waited in the magical steadfastness

of suspense, for her to take this knowledge of him as
he had taken it of her. He knew her darkly, with the
fulness of dark knowledge. Now she would know him,
and he too would be liberated. He would be nightfree, like an Egyptian, steadfast in perfectly
suspended equilibrium, pure mystic nodality of
physical being. They would give each other this
star-equilibrium which alone is freedom. (319)

This passage reveals glimpses of Lawrence's early musings on
the profound unconscious form of knowledge that he was to

define later in Psychoanalysis:
We know it by direct experience. All the best part
of knowledge is inconceivable. . . . Knowledge is
always a matter of whole experience . . . and never a
matter of mental conception merely. This is indeed
the point of all full knowledge: that it is contained
mainly within the unconscious, its mental or
cohscious reference being only a sort of extract or
shadow.

(215)
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However, in the preceding excerpt from "Excurse,"

Lawrence, through the narrator's use of the anticipatory
modal "would," must first review the criteria for ideal

union before he can describe the actual consununation between
Ursula and Birkin, let alone before he can talk about

unconscious knowledge in the essays.

Such preliminaries are

unnecessary for Gerald and Gudrun's consummation in "Death

and Love" because Lawrence is not attempting to describe an

unknown ideal union. Instead Lawrence describes the reality
of destructive union. "Their ^love' is a perverse
sexuality, a form of ontological masturbation in which the
partner is nothing more than an instrument for the

perfection of the Self. . . . that reguires a kind of

annihilation of the Self or of the Other" (Adamowski 354
355).

Gerald has a need which he fills at Gudrun's expense.
He had come for vindication.

She let him hold

her in his arms, clasp her close against him. He
found in her an infinite relief. Into her he poured
all his pent-up darkness and corrosive death, and he
was whole again. . . . And she, subject, received him
as a vessel filled with his bitter potion of death.
She had no power at this crisis to resist.

The

terrible frictional violence of death filled her, and
she received it in an ecstasy of. subjection, in
throes of acute, violent sensation. (344)
Gerald's need to be "whole again" and to find "an

infinite relief" (344) dominates the union, erasing the
possibility of "star equilibrium" with Gudrun.

Of great

significance is the narrator's choice of verbs to describe

Gerald's participation in this consummation—"he poured,"
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"he plunged," "he buried," "he Gleaved," and the adjectives
that describe Gerald's response to to Gudrun—-"dissolving
and sinking to rest," "healed," "whole again," "made whole,"

"palpitating with new life" (344-345).

The only verb

applied to Gudrun in these two pages is "received"; she has

become no more than a passive recipient of Gerald's anguish.
"But Gudrun lay wide awake, destroyed into perfect [mental]
consciousness" (not to be confused with LawrenCe's;ideal

unconscious), while Gerald enjoyed "the sleep of coriiplete

exhaustion and restoration"^ (345).

Neither Gerald nor

Gudrun has experienced Lawrence'spristiheUhcbnscigus state
through their union.

Instead, Gerald has escaped reality,

while Gudrun remains imprisoned in full mental
consciousness.

Conversely, after their actual consummation in

"Excurse," both Birkin and Ursula "slept the chillyv h^

through . . . a night of unbroken sleep" (320).

Also the

consummation itself is less aggressive than Gerald and
Gudrun's.

"Touch" is the primary verb used to describe both

Ursula's and Birkin's participation in this union, and it is

through "touch" that "knowledge" of the other is gained.
[He] gathered her to him. . . . his fingers upon
her unrevealed nudity . . . never to be seen with the
eye, or known with the mind, only known as a palpable
revelation of living otherness.
[She] touched, she received the maximums [sic]
of unspeakable communication in touch . . ■ . the
reality of that which can never be known . . . never
be transmuted into mind content. . . .

For she was

to him what he was to her, the immemorial
magnificence of mystic, palpable, real otherness.
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(320)

]!^preover, tlie Jcnowledge Pf pQuch being described by th^
narrator aligns perfeetly with Lawrence'S subsequent
definition of knowledge in the essays:
The aim is not mental consciousness.

We want

effectual human beings, not conscious ones.

final aim is npt to know, but to Jbe.

The

(Fantasia

The vast bulk of consciousness is non-cerebral.

is the sap of our life, of all life.

68)
It

(Psychoanalysis

217)

Ursula and Birkin have moved beyond the intense verbal
exchanges of earlier chapters to another realm, the realm of
touch.

So touch for Ursula and Birkin becomes a mattPr of

"whole experience," (Psychoanalysis 215) a "non-cerebral"

(Psychoanalysis 217) way to know one another more fully.
"Lawrence's thematic use of his psycho-biological theory of
the unconscious may be seen in his treatment of touch . . .

that it activates unconscious instinctual motives, not

rationally conceived ideas, into consciousness, thus making
both self-confrontation and encounter with the other

possible" (Cowan 27).

By the time the psychology essays are

written, Lawrence has figured out the significance of

"knowledge of the other," and he postulates that by learning
through union with another who we are not, we can come to

realize our own individuality:
Thus the first plane of the upper consciousness - the
outgoing, the sheer and unspeakable bliss of the
sense of union, communion, at-oneness with the
beloved - and then the complementary objective
realization of the beloved, the realization of that
which is apart, different. This realization is like

riches to the objective consciousness.

It is, as it

were, the adding of another self to the own self.
{Psychoanalysis 239-240)

in this: way, thxough union and knowledge of "another,"

individuals ca^n inore fully become themselves, not through
merging or isolation, but through "star eguilibrium"—that

ideal "polarity" between two people v ljawrence's "knowledge
Of the other" reflects the later post-str'uctural notion of

difference:

"Although it would be an overstatement to say

that Lawrence is a precursor of post-structuralism, he was
the first English writer to forward the notion of utter,
uncontained difference" (Jewinski 7).

In addition to Ursula and Birkin's newfound "knowledge"
of one another gained through "touch," the other significant
feature of their consummation is the "mindlessness," the
"unspeakable communication" that characterizes their union.

This state of "mindlessness" aligns with Lawrence's idea of
the unconscious—that deeper level where, he believed,
"truth" and fullness of experience could be found.
"Lawrence's knowledge of this first place of experience

permeates his writing.

He returns again and again to a mode

of knowing in which consciousness of another cannot be

grasped in 'cognitive' diacritical terms" (Schwartz 217).
In Fantasia Lawrence further defines the value of this

mindlessness or unconscious state as it relates to

consummation:

"The mystery must remain in its dark secrecy,

and its dark, powerful dynamism.
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The reality of sex lies in

the great dynamic convulsions in the soul.

And as such it

should be realized, a great creative^conclusive seizure upon
the soul" (113-114).
In "Excurse," the narrator is celebrating Ursula and
Birkin•s total abandonment of the mental and their mutual

participation with one another at the unconscious, non

verbal level.

Birkin's "fingers upon her unrevealed nudity

were the fingers of silence upon silence," and Ursula

"touched, she received the maximums [sic] of unspeakable
communication in touch, dark, subtle, positively silent"
(320).

It has taken them two-thirds of the novel and much

talking to get to this point.

"For she was to him what he

was to her, the immemorial magnificence of mystic, palpable,
real otherness" (320).

Birkin and Ursula's consummation may

be a non-verbal experience, but it is the narrator's verbal

expression of their consummation that epitomizes Lawrence's
ideal theory of the unconscious and union with the other.

Ragussis points out that this "state beyond language is,
paradoxically, wed to language" (198), as the narrator's

voice must often rise above the actual narrative experience,
especially over Birkin and Ursula's silence.

"But," as Bell

indicates, "wordlessness is not an option in fiction; not,
at least, for the author" (167), nor for the narrator.
In Ursula and Birkin's consummation readers can find

the seed of Lawrence's pristine unconscious and ideal union
coming to fruition through the narrator's words.

■

■

■
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However,

their union, only a momentary experience of less than a
page, is not indicative of the Ursula/Birkin relationship
throughout the novel, and certainly not in keeping with
their relationship by novel's end.

Nevertheless, Ursula and

Birkin were thejprimary site of Lawrence's exploration in
preparation of the theories he eventually outlined in the
essays.

Although by contrast Gerald and Gudrun's is the

failed relationship, Ursula and Birkin can only represent
the potential for Lawrence's ideal union in the novel.

Through Birkin and Ursula's consummation, WIL's

narrator explores what an ideal union might be, but neither
Lawrence nor his narrator resolve these theoretical issues

in the novel.

While resolution was not the outcome for

Lawrence in WIL^ exploration was his primary rhetorical
preoccupation. ','The result is ,a kind of novel of discovery,
didactic but experimental, prophetic but obedient to the
dictates of experience" (Spilka 6).

Frequently I in WIL Lawrence is assisted by "a narrative

voice which so heightens the implications of the ostensible
action that in some ways the narrative voice is more primary
than the action it describes" (Bell 213).

WIL's narrator

had to intrude frequently upon the narrative experience
itself, thereby assisting Lawrence in his "struggle for
verbal consciousness" within the novel.

Lawrence would

finally achieve !full theoretical expression only in the
I

psychology texts.
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Chapter Three

Theory Formulated in the Essays
Thus far in examining Lawrence's Women in Love as a

prelude to his two psychology essays, my analysis has

considered the exploratory and sometimes didactic role that
dialogue and narration played in the development of
Lawrence's significant themes of the uncdnsGious and union.
Also noteworthy are the claims that Lawrence himself made i
about each work and the relationship between his fiction and

his nonfiction/ between WIL and the essays.

|

In his Foreword to WIL, Lawrence explains that his

i;

novel is a record of his "own desires, aspirations,

struggles/" and that ^

for verhai consciousness"

is "not superimpositon of a theory" but his own "passionate
struggle into conscious being" {Phoneix II 275-276, emphasis

added).

Certainly Lawrence's claim that he has not

superimposed his theory upon his art is arguable, but
"struggle for verbal consciousness" is not disputable.

his
The

novel's text clearly reveals this struggle through dialogue,

particulary through the character of Rupert Birkin.
Overall Rupert and Ursula's many conversations reflect

both Rupert's and Lawrence's earnest effort to articulate a
theory of individual development through union.

As well,

the narrator's didactic intrusions reflect early
formulations of Lawrence's theories.
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Neyertheless, Lawrence

does not fully articulate his theories until he writes the
two psychology essays.

Some four to five years after WIL, when Lawrence wrote
the essays, he explained his effort to articulate his
theories in his foreword to Fantasia:

This pseudo-philosophy of mine - ^pollyanalytics', as
one of my respected critics might say - is deduced
from the novels and poems, not the reverse. The
novels and poems come unwatched out of one's pen.
And then the absolute need which one has for some

sort of satisfactory mental attitude towards oneself
and things in general makes one try to abstract some
definite conclusions from one's experiences as a
>
writer and as a man. The novels and poems are pure
passionate experience. These 'pollyanalytics' are
inferences made afterwards, from the experience.

■ ■

x;.'
The purpose of this study—to show that Lawrence began

to develop his psychology theories in his fiction—aligns
with Lawrence's first claim that he deduced the theories

from the novel.

However, his second claim that the novel

came "unwatched out of [his] pen" is certainly contradicted
by the preceding examination of both dialogue and narration

in WIL.

Although Lawrence's "struggle for verbal

consciousness" in WIL can be seen in not fully articulated

theories, nevertheless, his effort to develop these theories
through the novel was indeed conscious and deliberate.

In the paragraph that follows the one previously cited
from Fantasia*s foreword, Lawrence makes even more claims

about his unconscious intention when writing fiction:
And finally, it seems to me that even art is utterly
dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it, on a
metaphysic. The metaphysic or philosophy may not be

anywhere very accurately stated and may be quite
unconscious, in the artist, yet it is a metaphysic
that governs men at the time, and is by all men more
or less comprehended, and lived. . . . Then it is
unfolded into life and art. (15)
Lawrence's claims here can be considered at best

ingenuous or paradoxical, at worst contradictory.

On the

one hand he claims that his metaphysic governs him as he

writes, yet on the other, he suggests that he "may be"
unconsciously developing his metaphysic as he writes.

More

to the point, Lawrence's romantic notion of unconscious

metaphysical emanation is overruled by WIL's text and its
many examples of early theoretical development through

narration and dialogue.

The parallels between the

psychology essays' theory of the unconscious and union and

WIL's preliminary articulation of these theories, as well as
the jargon found in both, reveal a deliberate, conscious
effort by Lawrence, the novelist, to develop his "metaphysic

or philosopy" in WIL.

The polemic intention is not

unconscious, nor is the argument unconsciously "stated" in
the novel.

Lawrence's insistence that the artist's intention is

subserved to some higher form of truth was not new to him
when he wrote Fantasia.

In the earliest version of Studies

in Classical American Literature (SCAL hereafter), completed
shortly after he had finished writing WIL but before the
essays, Lawrence defined the artist's dual role:

"first,

the didactic import given by the author from his own moral

consciousness, and then the profound symbolic import which
proceeds from his unconscious or subconscious soul" {The
Symbolic Meaning 19).

In SCAL's final version, written at

the same time he was writing the psychology essays, Lawrence
is even more emphatic:

"The essential function of art is

moral. . . . But a passionate, implicit morality, not

didactic.

A morality which changes the blood, rather than

the mind.

Changes the blood first.

The mind follows later,

in the wake" (SCAL 180).

Finally and most telling, Lawrence explains in his

foreword to Fantasia his need to translate "art speech" into
nonfiction:

"We've got to . . . find what the heart really

believes in after all: and what the heart really wants . . .
And then we've got to put it down in terms of belief and of
knowledge" (16).

Here What the "heart really wants"

reiterates Lawrence's claims of (1) the theory that comes
unwatched from the writer's pen, (2) the artist's

unconscious metaphysic, and (3) the passionate morality that
changes the blood.

And Lawrence's imperative "to put it

down" explains his desire to articulate his theory—to
translate his initial novelistic explorations in WIL into
theoretical expression in the psychology essays.

Further,

through his desire "to put it down in terms of belief and of

knowledge," Lawrence extends art's "essential function" of
morality to his non-fiction texts.
Despite his preference for the novel as the arbiter of

64

!!truth,
form.

still chose to argue his theories in essay

Psychoanalysis thus represents his first formal

statement on the unconscious and union after experimenting

with these theories in WIL.

Psychoanalysis is not a dense

text, nor is it difficult to follow.

Reading this essay

gives the reader a reasonable, if not clear, understanding
of Lawrence's theory of the unconscious, the necessity of
coming into "spontaneous being" through realization of the
unc6hs;cious aind thrpugh union with another^ "two

synchronizing activites" (Psychoanalysis 221).
Although Lawrence had talked about "blood

consciousness" in SCAL and had experimented extensively with
relationships in his narratives, he had never committed to

writing a formal theoretical (what he might call
"metaphysical" or "philosophical") statement on the
unconscious and union until he wrote Psychoanalysis.

It is

early in this essay that Lawrence's first formal definition
of the unconscious appears:
We have actually to go back to our own unconscious.
But not the unconscious which is the inverted
reflection of our ideal consciousness.
We must

discover, if we can, the true unconscious, where our
life bubbles up in us, prior to any mentality. The
first bubbling life in us, prior to any mentality.
The first bubbling life in us, which is innocent of
any mental alteration, this is the unconscious. It

is pristine, not in any way ideal. It is the
spontaneous origin from which it behoves [sic] us to
live.

(212)

Throughout WIL, Birkin is never able to formulate a

formal definition like Lawrence's, indeed expressing his
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inability to do so in conversation with Ursula, first in the
"An Island" chapter when they have their initial discussion
on love:

*One must throw everything away, everything—let
everything go, to get the one last thing one wants,'
he said.

*What thing?' she asked in challenge.
don't know—freedom together,' he said.
(132)

In the "Mino" chapter—^the love—dialogue chapter—

Bitkin continues to express his uncertainty about what he is
seeking, and in this dialogue glimmers of Lawrence's
unconscious theory surface as Birkin stresses his concern

with preserving his own and Ursula's individuality:
• • I don't know.

At any rate, I don't feel the

emotion of love for you—no, and I don't want to.
Because it gives out in the last issues.' [Birkin]
'Love gives out in the last issues?' [Ursula;
narration omitted]

'Yes, it does.

At the very last, one is alone,

beyond the influence of love.

There is a real

impersonal me, that is beyond love, beyond any
emotional relationship. So it is with you. But we
want to delude ourselves that love is the root.

. . .' [Birkin]

(145)

The narrator echoes Birkin's concerns with preserving
the unconscious self later in the "Man to Man" chapter
through Birkin's narrated musings:

"And he wanted to be

single in himself, the woman single in herself. . . . he
wanted a further conjunction, where man had being dndwbiftan

had baing, two pure beings/ each constituting the freedom of
the other . . ." (199).
Although Lawrence continually discusses the unconscious
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throughout Psychoanalysis, his next formal statement on the

unconscious appears only three pages after the previously
cited defintion:

We knoy [the unconscious] by direct experience. All
the best part of knowledge is inconceivable. . . .
Knowledge is always a matter of whole experience
. . . and never a matter of mental conception merely.
This is indeed the point of all full knowledge: that
it is contained mainly within the unconscious, its
mental or conscious reference being only a sort of
extract or shadow.

(215)

In WIL Birkin and the narrator are beginning to
conceptualize Lawrence's preverbal, non-mental unconscious.

Birkin, in the "An Island" chapter, after hedging Ursula's
guestion, "But don't you think me good-looking?", roughly
summarizes Lawrence's non-mental unconscious in his response
to her query:
I want to find you, where you don't know your
own existence, the you that your common self denies
utterly. But I don't want your good looks, and I
don't want your womanly feelings, and I don't want
your thoughts nor opinions nor your ideas—they are
all bagatelles to me. (147)

Birkin is striving to find this unconscious state both

in himself and in Ursula, and in the "Excurse" chapter the
quest is finally realized.

But in "Excurse" the narrator's

utterances reify Lawrence's non-mental unconscious through

descriptions of Ursula and Birkin's impending consummation—

through an experience defined by its mindlessness and the
knowledge of touch-

She sat in a fulness and a pure potency that was like
apathy, mindless and immobile. . . . she would touch

the reality in him, the suave, pure, untranslateable
reality. . . . To touch, mindlessly in darkness, to
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come in pure touching upon the living reality of him
And he, too. . . . He knew her darkly, with the

fullness of dark knowledge . . . (319)
These examples clearly prefigure as well as reinforce

Lawrence's claim in Psychoanalysis that "[we] know [the

unconscious] by direct experience.

All the best part of

knowledge is inconceivable" (215).
Even though the WIL dialogues and narration do not
present a formal defintion of the unconscious, as do the
essays, nevertheless WIL does begin to formulate Lawrence's

conception of the unconscious as Birkin and Ursula guest for
an ideal relationship.

Lawrence extends their guest by

defining the ideal union in his essays.
For the end, the goal is the perfecting of each

single individuality, unique in itself - which cannot
take place without a perfected harmony between the
beloved, a harmony which depends on the at-last
clarified singleness of each being, a singleness
eguilibrized, polarized in one by the counter-posing
singleness of the other. Psychoanalysis (222,
emphasis added)

Birkin's discussion of union in the "Mino" chapter
closely paraphrases Lawrence's ideal union of equilibrium

expressed in the preceding excerpt from Psychoanalysis.
Although not verbatim, Birkin captures the essay's

significant idea of "singleness equilibrized, polarized" in
union when he tells Ursula:

What I want is a strange conjunction with you
. . . not meeting and mingling;—you are quite
right:—but an equilibrium, a pure balance of two
single beings:—as the stars balance each other.
(148, emphasis added)
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Later in "Mino" Birkin again explains:
[It] is the :1^ of creation^ On&^
Qhe
must commit oneself to a conjunction with the other—

forever. But it is not seifless--it is a maintaining
of the self in mystic balance and integrity-^-like a
star balanced with another star.

(152)

Lawrence's simultaneous "singleness" and "conjunction"
agrees with Lacan's theory "that all notions of selfhood

must be seen with two facts in mind:

inevitable inequality

(difference) and unavoidable singleness (utter oneness)"
(Jewinski 9).

Albeit a suspended moment in the novel, Ursula and

Birkin do fulfill their ideal union in "Excurse," expressed
through the narrator's deliberate delivery of their
consummation.

First, the narrator anticipates their soon-

to-be consummation as a union of equilibrium.

Although not

so definitive as Birkin's explanation or Lawrence's,
nonetheless the narrator is experimenting with this idea in

anticipation of their consummation and of the essays, in an
effort to define an ideal union through Ursula and Birkin.
He knew her darkly, with the fulness of dark
knowledge. Now she would know him, and he too would
be liberated.

He would be , . . steadfast in

perfectly suspended equilibrium, pure mystic nodality
of physical being. They would give each other this
star-equilibrium which alone is freedom. (319)
Even before "Excurse" the narrator discusses

equilibrium in a didactic passage represented as Birkin's

meditations, but it is clearly the narrator who is strongly
asserting these ideas about a sexual union that "[leaves]
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tw© single beings

constellated tbgether like two stairs,"

that is "tbe perfection of the polarised se2c^circuit" (201).
It is also the narrator who warns against "the horrible

merging, irtihglingseif-abnegation of love" <201).

(See ch,

2 above, pp. 43 & 45.)

bawreride's fiption had always^

preoccupied with

:

relationships, but in WIL Lawrence's search for the ideal

relationship becomes more deliberate than in his previous
narratives.

By the time he wrote WIL, Lawrence was

examining two opposing relationships.

The opposing couples,

however, were simply a means for Lawrence to explore the
theory he was to express more comprehensively in the essays,
but the couples are not a definitive representation of
success or failure in the novel.

In an effort to identify

the criteria of a successful union, Lawrence was examining a

failed relationship through Gerald/Gudrun and a potent!ally

ideal one through Ursula/Birkin> /
Through the narrator in "Excurse," Lawrence begins to
define his ideal of the unconscious and union with another,

manifesting the beginnings of his theory in Birkin and
Ursula's actual consummation.

Birkin and Ursula do not

sustain this ideal beyond "Excurse"'s end, but embodied in
their momentary union is Lawrence's ideal union.

Of less

significance to this study is Lawrence's inability to find
resolution in the novel.

More significant is the way he

■

used the two couples to explore his ideal theory articulated

later in his essays-'-an ideal not fully aehieved

characters in the novel, but only manifested temporarily in

Ursula and Birkin's consummation as expressed through the
narrator's voice.

[He] gathered her to him. . . . his fingers upon
her unrevealed nudity . . . never to be seen with the
eye, or known with the mind, only known as a palpable
revelation of living otherness.
[She] touched, she received the maximums [sic]
of unspeakable communication in touch . . . the
reality of that which can never be known . . . never
be transmuted into mind content. . . .

For she was

to him what he was to her, the immemorial

magnificence of mystid, palpabie, real otherness.
(320)

Of further significance are the parallels in language
between WIL and the essays.

The diction used in both

Birkin's and the narrator's discussions of union, such as

"equilibrium," "polarized-circuit," and "singleness,"
certainly affirms Lawrence's deliberate development of these
ideas in the novel.

Clearly Lawrence had begun developing

his ideas of the unconscious and union in WIL.

By the time Lawrence wrote his second essay. Fantasia,
a few months after completing Psychoanalysis, he began to

explore the implications of his theory of the unconscious
and union with another.

In this second essay, he discusses

the differences between the ideal union and those unions

that fail, in much the same way he compares Ursula and
Birkin to Gerald and Gudrun in WIL.

Lawrence develops the

contrast particularly in his examination of sexual

consummation.

The following excerpts from Fantasia sound
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like a replay of the opposing consuininations portrayed: in the
"Excurse" and ''Death and Love'' chapters^r
In the act of coition . . . the two individuals . , v

clash into oneness.

A great flash of interchange

occurs, like an eieetrical spark Or like lightning
out of the densely surcharged clouds. . . . and then
the tension passes-.
The two individuals are separate again. . . .

The air is as it were new, fresh, tingling with
newness.
So is the blood of man and woman after
successful coition.
After a false coition like

prostitution, there is not newness but a certain

[intervening paragraph omitted]
So the blood is changed and renewed, refreshed
almost re-created, like the atmosphere after thunder /
. . .

(106-107)

And again in the last chapter of Fantasia the metaphor is
reiterated:

But the main thing, as in the thunder-storm, is
the absolute renewal of the atmosphere in this case,
the blood . . .

And in this renewal lies the great magic of sex.
. . . And the only possible means of relief and
renewal is in pure passional interchange . . ;
. . . Sex passion as a goal itself always leads
to tragedy. . . . a slow humiliation and sterility.
(187-188)

■ These descriptions resemble the narrator's references
to each couple after consummation (see ch. 2 above, pp. 48
49, 55-56).

creatures.

Birkin and Ursula are described as reborn

Birkin "was as if born out of the cramp of a

womb" (311), "as if he had just come awake, like a thing
that is born . . i into a new universe" (312).

And Ursula

"was beautiful as a new marvellous flower opened" (313), "an

essential new being . . . quite free . . . in complete ease,
her complete self" (314).

At chapter's end,
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Birkin and

Ursula
"
slept the chilly night through under the hood of the
car, a night of unbroken sleep": (320).:
Conversely, Gerald and Gudrun are described in fatal
terms after their consummation.

Gudrun "felt as if she were

caught at last by fate, imprisoned in some horrible and

fatal trap" (325); "She died a little death" (329); "She

sipped the poison" (329).

As for Gerald, "A dangerous

resolve formed in his heart. . . . He would not go back to
night till he had come to her, if it cost him his life.
staked his all on his throw" (339).

He

Unlike Ursula and

Gerald's "night of unbroken sleep," Gerald slept "the sleep
of complete exhaustion," while "Gudrun lay wide awake,
destroyed into perfect consciousness.

She lay wide awake,

destroyed into perfect consciousness" (345).
The narrator's description of Gerald and Gudrun

certainly reflects Lawrence's argument in the preceding
Fantasia excerpt that "a false coition" brings
disintegration and that "[sex] passion as a goal itself"
leads to "humiliation and sterility."

This destructive

outcome is reiterated further in other parts of Fantasia:
"The passions or desires which are thought born are deadly"

(85);

"It is all will, the fatal love-will . . . only

deadly exaggerated volition" (80, Lawrence's emphasis).

For

Ursula and Birkin, the narrator recites a litany of positive
descriptions in "Excurse" that reinforce Fantasia's refrains

of renewal: "new, fresh, tingling with newness," "changed

and renewed, refreshed, almost re-created."

In addition to examining parallels between WIL and the
essays—how WIL's narration and dialogue reflect Lawrence's

earlier conceptual stages of his unconcscious and union
theory—it is also important to examine the rhetorical
parallels between Lawrence's fiction and non-fiction as well

as between the two essays.
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, written a few

months before Fantasia of the Unconscious, is a more

straightforward expository statement than the later

Fantasia.

In Psychoanalysis, Lawrence's goal is to expose

what he considers the evils of Freudian psychoanalysis and

its oedipal argument.

He also wants to replace these

Freudian tenets with his own theory of the unconscious.
in his fiction, his goal is moral:

As

to reveal "the moral

dilemma of psychoanalysis" and to help "us" readers "recover

our moral footing" via his gospel of the unconscious and
10

union

(Psychoanalysis 205 & 209).

His text is diagnostic

and prescriptive—he analyzes the problems and proposes the
solutions-—and he assumes an assertive didactic posture,
much as Birkin does when he proclaims his ideas and much as
WIL's narrator does when he makes didactic pronouncements.

Nevertheless, after the poor reception that
Psychoanalysis received, Lawrence found it necessary to

expand his original treatise and to elaborate extensively

his ideas on the unconscious, quadrupling its length in his
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second essay, Fantasia.

Fantasia then becomes a pseudo

scidntific tract in which Lawrence systematizes his theories
and attempts to create a science of body centers (lightly

discussed in the first ess^y)^s a means of conhection
between the individual and the external universe, in
particular between the individual and others.

More

important, in Psychoanalysis Lawrence simply "has the
answers," whereas in Fantasia he moves beyond his basic

theory of the unconscious by exploring the implications of

his theory for life's many relationships—education, child
rearing, marriage, gender roles, cosmology, sleep and
dreams—all to further illustrate and make more convincing

his theory of human development.
In spite of his efforts, Lawrence tells nothing new
about unconscious development and union in this second
essay.

Most of Fantasia's additions are simply expansions

of the theory already established in Psychoanalysis,
expansions that do not add significant new information to
the core of Lawrence's theory, and expansions that sometimes
become digressions.

However, reading Fantasia reveals

more than merely an expansion of Psychoanalysis.

A

rhetorical examination of these two essays reveals striking
differences between them, differences that further clarify
Lawrence's role as author of the psychology essays and of

The significant difference between the two essays is

...V .-TV
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found not so much in their content as in their style and
structure.

Lawrence does not say different things in both

essays; he says the same things differently in each.

It is

not the "what" of these essays, but the "how" that affects

the reader.

Lawrence creates a significantly different

persona in Fantasia than in Psychoanalysis.

By Fantasia,

the writer's voice and the tone of the text have altered

considerably.

According to Evelyn J. Hinz in her article on

the psychology essays, the differences in style and
structure are so significant that "not only must Fantasia be
viewed as a new statement rather than as a re-statement but
also that it must be viewed as a different kind of work from

Psychoanalysis" (252, Hinz's emphasis).

She describes the

change from the first essay to the second as a movement from

"an empirical" to "a poetic methodology," from "an analytic"
to "an archetypal approach to the unconscious" (252).

Another assessment of the two essays can be found in D.
H. Lawrence's Non-fiction.

David Ellis agrees that "[it] is

important not to lump the two psychology books together:
they do have a different character," yet he claims "the link

with the earlier [essay] is nevertheless maintained.

In

matters other than scope. Fantasia is much less of a

departure than it tends at first to seem"^^ (83-84).

He

further explains that after the unfavorable reception

received by the first essay. Psychoanalysis, Lawrence wrote

in a different style and voice in the second essay,
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Fantasia:

"Patronizing yet defensive."

This change in

persona evolved as a result of Lawrence's "unease about his

readership" (72).

In this second essay Lawrence is much more verbose, yet
unsure of himself much like Birkin "the word-bag" of WIL.
Lawrence's persona shifts from the authoritative

spokesperson in Psychoanalysis to the more defensive, selfconscious speaker in Fantasia.

plagues this text.

Indeed a tentativeness

This is the most significant

characteristic of the second essay.

Often when making an

assertion, Lawrence will qualify his statement, undercut it,
and when he does this, he appears to be second guessing
himself.

At these times Lawrence's response is much like

Birkin's when Ursula pushes him to prove himself further in
their dialogues (see above, pp. 21-23).

By contrast in

Psychoanalysis, where Lawrence completes the explorations

that he began in WIL, he unhesitatingly develops a
comprehensive statement of his theory of the unconscious and

union.

There is no questioning of or experimenting with

ideas in this essay as Lawrence had done in the novel.

Both

the unconscious and union with the other are defined and

articulated in a straightforward, declarative fashion.

First Lawrence speaks in the third person to elaborate,
explain, and educate readers regarding his theories.

Then

Lawrence uses the first person "we" to instruct the reader,
as well as to suggest an affinity with the reader.
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This

strategy is reminiscent of WIL's narrator who assumes the

same posture when speaking in the first person plural,

specifically in the "Man to Man" and "Sunday Evening"
chapters (see above, pp. 38-39, 45-46)

Also important is the tone.

Embodied in Psychoanalysis

is the voice of a confident advocate who is convinced of the

value of realizing one's "pristine unconscious" through
"union with another."

Lawrence is at home with his ideas,

convinced of their worth, and eager to pass them on to a
world he, like Birkin and the narrator of WIL, finds weary
of isolation and mechanization.

Lawrence has already arrived at his conclusions by the

time he writes Psychoanalysis and is ready to declare them

without hesitation or questioning.

He is making direct

affirmative statements, statements in which his "we" does
far more than presume alliance with his readers.

By virtue

of his lack of hesitancy, he presumes consensus from his
readers.

Psychoanalysis has sprung many surprises on us,
performed more than one volte-face before our indignant
eyes. No sooner had we got used to the psychiatric
quack who vehemently demonstrated the serpent of sex
coiled round the root of all our actions, no sooner had
we begun to feel honestly uneasy about our lurking
complexes, than lo and behold the psychoanalytic
gentleman reappeared on the stage with a theory of pure
psychology.

(201)

The essay's opening immediately asserts an a priori argument

assuming a community of believers.

Lawrence creates this

illusion at once, integrating his "we's" and his "our's"
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with his third person indictment against psyGhoanalysis as
though he were truly partaking in a dialogue with others who
share similar beliefs.

But Lawrence is the only one

speaking, and there is no dialogue occurring between
Lawrence and any other.

Four paragraphs later in this first chapter,

"Psychoanalysis vs Morality," Lawrence forcefully states his
■case^ with^'no''hesitation-:.
First and foremost the issue is a moral issue.

:

It is not here a matter of reform, new moral values.
it is the life or death of all morality. The leaders
among the psychoanalysts know what they have in hand.
Probably most of their followers are ignorant, and
therefore pseudo-innocent. But it all amounts to the
same thing. Psychoanalysis is out, under a

therapeutic disguise, to do away entirely with the
moral faculty in man. Let us fling the challenge and
then we can take sides in all fairness. (202)
Out of the eight sentences in the preceding citation,

seven are third person statements outlining the sorry state
of psychoanalysis; these seven are then highlighted by the
paragraph's closing sentence, a challenge addressed to the
reader in the first person plural voice.

First Lawrence

cleverly states his case in the third person as if it were

simple fact, then personally engages readers to act on this
indisputed fact with his first person plural voice in the
last sentence

This same pattern can be seen interacting

among the opening paragraphs of the essay as well:
Lawrence's effective blend of his third person voice that

instructs authoritatively with his first person plural voice

79

that presumes allegiance from his readership.

Further illustration of this pattern is exemplified in

a six paragraph sequence beginning with the paragraph cited
above.

The second paragraph that follows also opens in the

third person:

"The psychoanalytic leaders know what they

are about," and the paragraph continues with more third
person indictments against psychoanalysis, also asserted as

established fact.

Lawrence then feigris a receptive audience

by closing the paragraph with:

"[We] hear the dull rumble

of the incipient avalanche" and"We are in for a debacle"

(202).

These two third person paragraphs each close with a

"we" statement that presumes a connection between reader and
writer.

A paragraph then follows that builds on this

connection by drawing the reader into the good fight through

its abundant use of the first person plural voice:
But at least let us know what we are in for.

If

we are to rear a serpent against ourselves, let Us at
least refuse to nurse it in our temples or to call it
the cock of Aesculapius. It is time the white garb
of the therapeutic cant was stripped of the
psychoanalyst. And now that we feel the strange
crackling convulsion in our moral foundations, let us
at least look at the house which we are bringing down
over our heads so blithely. (202)

Standing alone the third paragraph serves to reinforce the

claims made in the two preceding third person paragraphs by
pulling the reader into the argument in the same way that

the indivdual closing "we" statements of each preceding
paragraph have created consensus for each pargraph's

individual argument.
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The fourth paragraph again pulls the reader to

Lawrence's view by Its opening first person plural
announcement:

"Long ago we watched In frightened

anticipation when Freud set out" (202).

Having designed an

artificial audience of participants through his deceptive
"we watched [Freud]," Lawrence then embarks on a rambling
two-paragraph myth about Freud, all In third person

statements presented as truth.

The final sixth paragraph,

following LawrenceVs third person narrative on Freud,

reinforces the "we watched" theme In Its opening sentence:
"With dilated hearts we watched Freud. . . " (202-203).
Lawrence has purposely sequenced his pronouns both

within the Individual paragraphs as well as In the overall
arrangement of the six paragraphs collectively.

From

Informing readers through seemingly established third person
statements of fact, Lawrence builds his argument by feigning

a dialogue between himself and readers, first through direct
address In the first person plural voice, and finally,
through his forceful use of "we" statements that have the

rhetorical power to draw readers Into moral certitude with
him.

Lawrence's narrator uses this same strategy of

Intermingling pronouns In the "Man to Man" and "Sunday
Evening" WIL chapters (see above, pp. 37-39, 45-46).

In

each chapter, the narrator first presents Blrkln's and

Ursula's views respectively In third person statements that
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within the context of the narrative can be accepted by the
reader as the character's thoughts—as established fact.
From there the narrator launches into the persuasive "we"

voice presenting a philosophy that belongs to the narrator,
not to the characters.

Here too the rhetorically effective

first person plural voice serves to create a pseudoconnection between the reader and the text.

The narrator

assumes a solitary didactic posture like Lawrence's in
Psychoanajysis, but there is no real audience as there is in

Fantasia where Lawrence is responding to critics' assessment
of Psychoanalysis (to be discussed later in this chapter) or
as there is in WIL where Birkin must respond to Ursula.
The interacting of these two voices continues

throughout Psychoanalysis.

Again in his "we" voice,

Lawrence immediately rouses the reader at the beginning of
Chapter Two to find a new way, one better than Freudian

psychoanalysis has offered:

"It is obvious we cannot

recover our moral footing until we can in some way determine

the true nature of the unconscious" (209, emphasis added).

Having established his imaginary community of moral
consentors in Chapter One, Lawrence is now setting up his
readers, getting them ready to accept his definition of the
unconscious, which will be another third person recitation.
Lawrence's definition of the unconscious serves as a base

from which his theory of union springs and, ultimately, the
union of Ursula and Birkin in WIL.

The word unconscious itself ie a mere definition by
negation and has no positive meaning. Freud no doubt
prefers it for this reason. He rejects subconscious
and preconscious, because both [terms] would imply a
sort of nascent consciousness, the shadowy
consciousness which precedes mental realization.
(209, Lawrence's emphases)

By this point, only eight lines into the second chapter of
his essay, Lawrence has set the stage for his definition of
the unconscious—the task at hand for chapter two and the
essence of the essay.

In the following three pages, he further sets the stage
by showing that Freud's unconscious is mentally derived,
thus "[the] incest motive is a logical deduction of human
reason" (210).

After only three pages, and mostly through a

deceptively simple rhetorical technique, Lawrence has

established a captive audience, if not one ready to accept

his theory of the unconscious.

He accomplishes this mainly

through the use of pronouns and by pronoun placement:

on

the one hand by strong third person assertions and on the

other by insistent first person plural statements, always
directly addressing his readers while presenting his case.
And finally he states his case for the unconscious in full:
. . . We have actually to go back to bur own
unconscious.

But not to the unconscious which is the

inverted reflection of our ideal consciousness.

We

must discover, if we can, the true unconscious, where
our life bubbles up in us, prior to any mentality.
The first bubbling life in us, which is innocent of
any mental alteration, this is the unconscious.

is pristine, not in any way ideal.

It

It is the

spontaneous origin from which it behoves us to live.

(212)
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[intervening paragraph omitted]
. . . And where life begins the unconscious also

begins. But mark, the first naked unicellular
organism is an individual. It is a specific
individual, not a mathematical unit, like a unit of
force.

(212-213)

Where the individual begins, life begins. The
two are inseparable, life and individuality. And
also, where the individual begins, the unconscious,
which is the specific life-motive, also begins
. . .

(213, Lawrence's emphasis)

[two intervening paragraphs omitted]
. . . By the unconscious we wish to indicate

that essential unique nature of every individual
creature, which is, by its very nature, unanalysable,
undefinable, inconceivable. It cannot be conceived,
it can only be experienced in every single instance.
And being inconceivable, we will call it the
unconscious. As a matter of fact/ soul would be a
better word. By the unconscious we do mean soul.
But the word soul has been vitiated by the idealistic

use, until nowadays it means only that which a man
conceives himself to be.

And that which a man

conceives himself to be is something far different
from his true unconscious. So we must relinquish the
idea [ideal] word soul. (214-215, Lawrence's
emphasis)
In three pages packed with continuous definition and

discussion of the necessity of returning to the unconscious
as the source of life, Lawrence has invited readers to

regain a Utopian state that will carry them through all of
life's experiences.

Presumably, his audience is to be

captured by the rhetoric and swept up in the romantic notion

of returning to their very own selves, the true source of

life and knowledge.

If Lawrence were simply using the

instructive third person, readers could not be drawn in
personally to his argument:

his "we's" bid "us" to enter

his world of ideas/ to accept his salvation of the
unconscious, or at least to ponder it as a possibility in
"our" lives.

Lawrence's rhetorical strategies are surely
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seductive/

at the leasl:, can tempt "us" into accepting

his "pristine unconscious," or rather, "our" "pristine
unconSGious..

By the time he writes the last chapter of the essay, he
can indulge himself/ and "us,'^ finally in a full thirdperson pronouncement that summarizes his theory of the
• unconscious.

■■■

Thus it would seem that the term unconscious is only
another word for life. But life is a gehefai force,

whereas the unconscious is essentially single and
unigue in each individhal^ organism; it is the active/
self-evolving soul bringing forth its own incarnation
and self-manifestation.

Which incarnation and self-

manifestation seems to be the whole goal of the
unconscious soul: the whole goal of life. Thus it is
that the unconscious brings forth not only
consciousness, but tissue and organs also. (242)
Also by Chapter Five's end (immediately preceding the

above citation), Lawrence•s full third person pronouncements
sum up his theory of union—body centers and all.
Thus the first plane of the upper consciousness
- the out-going, the sheer and unspeakable bliss of
the sense of union, communion, at-oneness with the
beloved - and then the complementary objective
realization of the beloved, the realization of that
which is apart, different. This realization is like
riches to the objective consciousness. It is, as it
were, the adding of another self to the own self,

through the mode of apprehension . . .
[two intervening paragraphs omitted]
The goal of life is the coming to perfection of
each single individual. This cannot take place
without the tremendous interchange of love from all
the four great poles of the first, basic field of
consciousness. There must be the twofold passionate
flux of sympathetic love, subjective-abdominal and
objective-devotional, both. And there must be the
twofold passional circuit of separatist realization,
the lower, vital self-realization, and the upper,
intense realization of the other, a realization which
includes a recognition of abysmal otherness . . .

(239-241, Lawrence's emphasis)

It is important to note in the preGeding essay citations
that once Lawrence engages in an extended recitation of his

theories, he leaves the "we" address behind as he forges
into his earnest ayowal of life, of his theory.
Lawrence has created a specious audience in

Psychoanalysis, a specious "we."

Like the narrator in WIL,

Lawrence is a solitary speaker in the first essay.

In

Psychoanalysis--unlike the novel's dialogue where
characters, partiGularly Ursula and Birkin, are forced to
interact with one another and unlike Fantasia where Lawrence

is responding to the critics of Psychoanalysis—there is no
such "other" with whom Lawrence is engaging.

In

Psychoanalysis Lawrence is proclaiming his beliefs

independently and creating an imaginary community of
believers into which he deceptively pulls the reader through
his use of"we."

Although he follows a similar strategy in WIL's

narration, the narrator's ideal claims can be more readily
questioned by the action of the novel, the real experience

of life.

But in non-fiction, in Psychoanalysis

specifically, there is only theory, no experience.

Here

Lawrence could finally outline his ideal theory without
interruption.

At the same time Lawrence could make readers

a part of his "we" discussion, thus creating an illusion of
participation in a dialogue that does not in fact exist in

-

86 ■

this text.

By the time Lawrence writes[Fantasia, there is

"another" to whom he responds, the critics of

More defensive and self-conscious in his posture,
hawrence seems to be struggling to prove himself in the

second essay, to justify his theory, a position he did not

assume in the first essay.

In the process, he sounds

discomfited, and his uneasiness is reflected in the rhetoric

of Fantasia.

In this second essay, a different voice can be

heard and a different tone experienced—one that is cynical,
even mocking.

When forced to confront his claims, to

justify them for an unsympathetic audience, something

interesting happens to Lawrence.

Uncomfortable, perhaps,

with his own seriousness and his own intensity, he does not
mock only those readers who cannot understand his theory,
but he mocks himself as well.

In spite of his self-

conscious, defensive posture that can dislodge the reader,
Lawrence still makes his pronouns work for him in this
second essay, including his new "I" voice that enters the
text.

:.V' \ '

The most radical change that occurs from Psychoanalysis

to Fantasia is Lawrence's overt use of the first person
singular and his blatant, often facetious, apostrophes.
Although he occasionally departs from "we" to "I" in
Psychoanalysis, one has to search extensively for the
pronominal shift from the inclusive "we" to the exclusive

"I" in his first essay.

But by Fantasia, the "I" screams

from the pages, betrayihgf a hyper self-ConsGious speaker in
^^^Lawience

\

In spite of the first person singular intrusions,
Lawrence stiH retaiiis both his plural first person "we" and

his instructive third person from the first essay, but at
times they lose some of their persuasive power as they are
diluted by his personal entrance into the dialbgue.

Later

in the essay they become secondary to his new, inflated "I
am I" persuasive strategy.
Nevertheless, the shift of "we" to "I" from

Psychoanalysis to Fantasia is significant.

Lawrence's first

person singular voice in this second essay serves a

deliberate rhetorical function.

Not only does Lawrence's

"I" stand out in the second essay, but it is present
immediately to the reader in Fantasia^ s Foreword.

Here

Lav/rence engages in direct dialogue with his readership and

direct confrontation with his critics.

He begins his second

essay:

The present book is a continuation from

Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. The generality
of readers had better just leave it alone. The
generality of critics likewise. I really don't want

to convince anybody. It is quite in opposition to my
whole nature. I don't intend my books for the
generality of readers. I count it a mistake of our
mistaken democracy that every man who can read print
is allowed to believe that he can read all that is

printed. I count it a misfortune that serious books
are exposed in the public market, like slaves exposed
naked for sale.

But there we are, since we live in

an age of mistaken democracy, we must go through with
; it. ■
■ , .

I warn the generality of readers, that this

present book will seem to theiri only ia rether more >
revolting mass of wordy nonsense than the last. I

would Warn the generality of critics to throw it in
the waste paper basket without more ado.
AS for the limited few, in whom one must

perforce find an answerer, I may as well say straight
off that I stick to the solar plexus. That statement
alone, I hope, will thin their numbers considerably.
Finally, to the remnants of a remainder, in
order to apologize for the sudden lurch into
cosmology, or cosmogony, in this book, I wish to say
that the whole thing hangs inevitably together. I am
not a scientist.

I am an amateur of amateurs.

As

one of my critics said, you either believe or you
dou't. (11)
VV

Of the seventeen sentences that comprise the first four
paragraphs of Lawrence's Foreword, over half bear "I" as

their subject.

Defensive, even facetious, Lawrence's voice

is forcibly asserted in this opening statement, and his "I"
is pronounced.

It is clear that Lawrence is speaking, and

not a distanced representation of Lawrence.
In these opening paragraphs, Lawrence creates an

exclusive audience for himself through his "I" voice and
through direct address.

Lawrence dismisses immediately "the

generality of readers" and "the generality of critics" in

his first sentences.

Through these opening statements, in

his use of the first person singular, as a speaker in a
dialgoue with others, Lawrence becomes visible—something he
did not do in the first essay.

By virtue of his "I" statements that reject the

majority of readers as his audience, Lawrence is cleverly
creating another imaginary audience for this essay.
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He is

defining an exclusive, elitist audience—the chosen few

readers who

capable of understanding his ittessage.

To

make membership in this select group seem real, Lawrence
reverts back to the inclusionary "we" of Psychoanalysis in
the closing sentence of this essay's first paragraph,
enticing readers not only into membership but also into
agreement.

The second paragraph reinforces the opening

paragraph's first sentences by reiterating his exclusion of

the majority, again through his direct address to the
"generality" of readers and critics.

.

In Fantasia's two opening paragraphs, Lawrence's "I"

works in the same way that his third person did in the first
essay—to establish an a priori argument, in this case, the
existence of incapable readers.

Both his direct address and

his "we's" then draw readers in, who, if they are to
consider themselves part of the chosen readership, must
therefore agree with Lawrence's premise.

Again through

pronoun use and placement Lawrence can draw readers into his

audience and ultimately into agreement with his argument.
But in Fantasia Lawrence's "I's" make him the visible

speaker who takes responsibility for the assertions, whereas

in Psychoanalysis Lawrence hides behind his "we" assertions.
Although Lawrence becomes visible through his "I" voice

in this second essay, he also uses the first person singular
as a manipulative, rhetorical strategy that allows him not
only to win connection and consensus from the "few," but to
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give his defense credibility against the critics who

rejected the first essay.
excludes and includes.

Thus Lawrence's response at once

Fantasia•s third and fourth

paragraphs' direct addresses, "the limited few" and "the
remnants of a remainder,,'' function iike t

Psychoanalysis.

They establish connection between reader

and writer before Lawrence launches into his belief system
(several paragraphs) as a prelude to the essay itself.

Having drawn readers into his circle, he can now present his

views as established fact.

As in the first essay, here

Lawrence's pronoun selection and direct addresses are

strategically placed within and among paragraphs in
persuasive progression in an attempt to win his readers'
consensus.

In spite of the profusion of "I" throughout this
"Foreword," Lawrence engages readers in the closing

peroration to his Foreword, abruptly shifting to a

predominant first person plural voice, then closing with the

third person and his solipsistic "I" in the very last
paragraph.

. . . Our vision, our
wearing woefully thin, and
absolutely threadbare. We
for our hopes nor our aims

belief,
the art
have no
nor our

our metaphysic is
is wearing
future; neither
art. It has all

gone grey and opaque.

We've got to rip the old veil of a vision
across, and find what the heart really believes in
after all: and what the heart really wants, for the
next future. And we've got to put it down in terms
of belief and of knowledge. And then go forward
again, to the fulfilment [sic] in life and art.
Rip the veil of the old vision across, and walk
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through the rent.

why not?
not?

And if I try to do this - well,

If I try to write down what I see - why

If a publisher likes to print a book - all

right.

Ahd if anybody wants to read it/ let him.

But why anybody should read one single word if he

doesh't want to, I don't see.

Unless of course he is

a critic who needs tp scribble a dollar's worth of

words, no matter how.

(15-16)

Lawrence effectively u^

the possessive third person,

plural in the firs^ paragraph to create further consensus
from his established audience.

Not only does he summarize

his moral mission as an artist, but he makes his mission a

shared cause:

"our vision," "our belief," "our metaphysic,"

"our hopes," "our aims," "our art."

In the first paragraph,

Lawrence has designed a mutual cause that prepares the

reader

for his call-to-arms, "we've got to," of the second

paragraph.

Additionally, in this closing seguence to the

Foreword, Lawrence first establishes himself as a credible

speaker by making his moral concerns the reader's in order

to at once justify his facetious response to the critics in

the closing paragraph and to win consensus for the essay
that follows.

In this example, Lawrence has cleverly used

his "we's" and "our's" to create an audience who will be

receptive to the second essay.

Ellis's explanation of the Foreword's origin is most
telling:
These hostile preliminaries become more
understandable when one discovers that they were once
not preliminary at all but the continuation of ^An
Answer to Some Critics' (Lawrence's initial sub-title
for his ^Foreword'), the first, major part of which
Seltzer declined to publish. In September 1921 he
had sent Lawrence a score of reviews of

PsychoanaJ^ysls and the Unconscionsf to which the

original waning of Fantasia is a relatively detailed
response!

(72)

Hinz explains Lawrence's negative response to his readership
in another way:
negative appeal to a few fit readers can

be viewed as something more than a peevish reaction
to the critical fate of Psychoanalysis. (258)
But his argument is not that the majority cannot
read, i.e., are insensitive, but that the average man
should not read: the first is the typical defensive
complaint of the misunderstood writer, but the second
is a statement of principle. . .one of the central
themes of Fantasia.

(258)

Considering Ellis's explanation of the critical
background that evoked such "hostile preliminaries" makes

Lawrence's design in creating a new audience all the more
noteworthy.

In spite of his facetious tone and his blatant

presence in the dialogue of the Foreword, Lawrence was still

clever enough to evoke a sympathetic audience through what
Hinz defines as "a statement of principle."

By arguing

"that the average man should not read," Lawrence invites

readers to join the elitist audience of capable readers and

he wins a constituency for himself in an effort to bridge
the chasm left by critics.

In this way Lawrence can engage

himself more readily with his newly established, receptive

audience rather than directly addressing the critics'
concerns, thereby giving himself more latitude to expound

and justify his theory in the second essay.
In his article "D. H. Lawrence and the Fantasias of

Consciousness," John B. Vickery considers Lawrence's
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approach to his readership through a study of persuasion and
.^engagementr-'s/

A:

f-;

^

The nervy dissonance of this sort of language is
clearly designed to galvanise the reader not only
into a state of alert attention and active

involvement but also into a process of individual
thoughtfulness rather than the customary thinking
based on habit and learned conceptual responses. At
first sight, it appears to be the antithesis of the
rhetoric of persuasion, but on closer inspection it
does carry its own kind of persuasiveness. (172)

This "nervy dissonance" characterizes not only the
foreword, but all of Fantasia, and Vickery's observation

applies more to the essay as a whole (especially the "I am
I" section to be discussed later) than to the Foreword

specifically.

Yet Lawrence does create "alert attention,"

"active involvement," and "individual thoughtfulness" in the

Foreword by making readers a part of his "we," his unique

circle, thereby distinguishing his audience from the
"generality of readers" and the "generality of critics" that
his "I" shuns.

The foreword thus serves as a rhetorical

prototype for the entire essay with its vacillation from

"we" to "I," its intermittent defensive, mocking tone, and
its sometimes biting direct-address.
Finally in Chapter Three Lawrence's use of "I" takes on

a magnitude beyond the "I" of the preceding thirty-three
pages—one that is sure to engage readers and one that
buttresses his theory of the unconscious presented in his
first essay.

At this point in Fantasia, readers can join Ursula by
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saying, "[And] you go all this way round to [tell me]"

; (148), because it is here, after all of Lawrence's lengthy
preliminaries, that the core of his theory of the
uncoiisgious is expressed, but in a way far different from

the previous essay.

Here Lawrence engages the first person

singular in a sobering and persuasive style to capture "our"
attention, as he eloguently pleads his case for the
existence of the pre-mental unconscious state within each of

The solar plexus, the greatest and most
important centre of our dynamic consciousness, is a

;

sympathetic centre.

At this main centre of our first

mind we know as we can never mentally know.
Primarily we know, each man, each living creature
knows, profoundly and satisfactorily and without
guestion, that I am I. This root of all knowledge
and being is established in the solar plexus; it is
dynamic, pre-mental knowledge, such as cannot be

;

transferred into thought. Do not ask me to transfer
the pre-mental dynamic knowledge into thought. It
cannot be done. The knowledge that I am I can never
be thought: only known. (34, Lawrence's emphasis)
In spite of his third person syntax dealing with the
solar plexus and fusion, Lawrence personalizes the

,

unconscious with his "J am J" statements and his "we" and

"our," more intimately involving the audience much as he has

done in the Foreword's closing.

Through this inclusionary

tactic Lawrence not only creates agreement with his
audience, but he also diminishes the voices of

Psychoanalysis' critics by bringing his new audience to the
fore.

His strategy in the second essay makes his newly
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created audience more prominent, thus engaging readers more

directly and more persuasively than in the first essay.
Although his defintion of the unconscious in Psychoanalysis

also incorporates the first person plural with third person
explanations, there is more distance between Lawrence and

the reader (see above, pp. 83-84).

Psychoanalysis^

invitation to the reader to "know" the unconscious does not

hold the same certainty for the reader as Fantasia^s

declaration does:

"We must discover, if we can; the true

unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior to any

mentality" (Psychoanalysis 212).
urgency, but not hope.

Here the reader is given

By Fantasia Lawrence includes the

reader with himself in his intimate "knowing" of the

unconscious:

"Primarily we know, each man, each living

creature knows, profoundly and satisfactorily and without
guestion that I am I" (34, Lawrence's emphasis).
Not only does Lawrence include the reader in his

community of the ideal unconscious through his affirmative
"we know" in Fantasia versus his "[we] must discover, if we
can" in Psychoanalysis, but he ensures inclusion for his
readers through his "I am I" definition.

Here his "I" takes

on a cosmic magnitude (Hinz 264), leaving behind Lawrence's
awkward and conspicuous "I" of the Foreword.

Yet Lawrence

is still able to define in third person assertions his
criteria for the ideal unconscious—that it originates at
the solar plexus, that it is premental, and most important,
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that it "can never be thought: only known."

in just one

paragraph Lawrence has accomplished a dual feat for Fantasia
by making his definition of the unconscious believable both

to and for the reader—all through effective use of his
inclusionary "we" and introduction of his "I am I"

The four paragraphs that follow further define the

unconscious and its relationship to the primary body
centers—the solar plexus and the lumbar ganglion—

completely in third person syntax (with one exception),

closing with repetitions of the engaging "I am I" in the
fourth paragraph.

By initially creating consensus in his

first paragraph (cited above), Lawrence has created
receptivity to his third person defintion of the unconscious

in the four paragraphs that follow.

Again not only is

pronoun choice key, but pronoun sequencing as well.
However, Lawrence has done far more than create

consensus in his very first paragraph, he has created union,

a union reminscent of WIL's star equilibrium.

Lawrence's

"we's" at once create union between him and his readers,

while his "I am I" creates "the other" by signifying the
individual reader, separate from Lawrence the writer and

separate from his audience of other individual readers.

By

the time Lawrence finishes his first paragraph defining the
unconscious, he has already implied his theory of union with
the other through his "we's" and "I am I," thus creating

affinity with readers as well as credibility for the second
part of his theory in the sixth paragraph of this series.
And as he moves from establishing the solar plexus as the
source of "our" own unconscious sslves/ "our" own

individuality in the first paragraphy he then establishes

"our" connection with Others, the second part of his theory,
union with the other in the sixth paragraph.
But at the lumbar ganglion, which is the centre

of separate identity, the knowledge is of a different
mode, though the term is the same.

At the lumbar

ganglion I know that I am I, in distinction from a
whole universe, which is not as I am. This is the

first tremendous flash of knowledge of singleness and
separate identity. I am I, not because I am at one
with all the universe, but because I am other than
all the universe. It is my distinction from all the
rest of things which makes me myself. Because I am
set utterly apart and distinguished from all that is
the rest of the universe, therefore I am I. And this
root of our knowledge in separateness lies rooted all
the time in the lumbar ganglion. It is the second
term of our dynamic psychic existence. (35-36)
Although the sixth paragraph does not define union

directly or describe it in the experiential terms of
consummation that WIL does, neverthless the narrator's words

in "Excurse" come to mind—the narrator's "palpable
revelation of living otherness" that Birkin and Ursula

discover in their union (320).

And some four pages later by

the end of Fantasia's Chapter Three, Lawrence summarizes his

theory as it relates to the sympathetic and voluntary
centers of the body, and as it relates to this theory of

union:

"Between the dark, glowing first term of knowledge

at the solar plexus - I am I, all is one in me; and the
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first term of volitional knowledge: I am myself, and these
others are not as I am — there is a world of difference"

(40, Lawrence's emphasis).

In this "J am I" portion of Fantasia Ellis's argument,
that Lawrence uses the first person singular to demonstrate
"his belief in the importance of an instinctive noncerebral
relation with the outside world," becomes credible, but

certainly not in the preceding pages where his "I" is of an
altogether different character, "making the reader more
aware of Lawrence as an individual and a writer" (75).
There is indeed a stark contrast between the first

thirty-three pages of this essay and the ensuing third
chapter, evidenced by the intermittent use of "I" and "we"

throughout third person syntax in the first two chapters
versus insertion of the persuasive "I am I" in the third
chapter.

Pronoun usage and order take on even more

significance here as they operate not only within and among
paragraphs, but also as they operate within and among

chapters.

Lawrence's solipsistic application of the first

person singular in the first two chapters opposes a more
powerful and persuasive 'I' in Lawrence's third chapter—

what Hinz calls "the cosmic ^I'" (264).

In this chapter

Lawrence boldy proclaims "J am I" as a universal call to all

of "us" readers to affirm "our" own individuality, "our" own
unconscious, "our" own "spontaneous being."
The end of Chapter Three provides powerful closure for

his theory and for this second essay, unlike his actual
closing chapter some 150 pages later which leaves the reader
suspended and unresolved.

Essentially Lawrence's essay is

complete after these first 41 pages, and everything else

that follows becomes anti-climactic, adding nothing new to

his theory.

To explore these expansions and digressions

following Chapter Three, which make up the bulk of
Lawrence's second text, is too ambitious a project for the

confines of this study, nor would such an exploration add

anything of consequence to the argument presented here.
While Lawrence has uttered nothing new in Fantasia, he
has certainly argued for the case he presented in
Psychoanalysis, albeit sometimes a disconcerting argument.

In spite of these limitations, Lawrence has cleverly pled

his case for realization of the unconscious through union by
implementation of his rhetorically persuasive "I" in the
second essay,

Equally important, the beginnings of these ■

arguments can been traced to WIL where Birkin and the

narrator begin Lawrence•s exploration of the unconscious and
union theory.
Although Lawrence was able to realize the "struggle for

verbal consciousness" that he had begun in WIL through his

formal statement of theory in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia,
rhetorical examination of the essays shows that Lawrence was
engaged in another kind of "struggle for verbal
consciousness" in these nonfiction texts
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This second

struggle is one of creating audience and consensus.

First in Psychoanalysis Lawrence expounds his theories

but remains invisible to his audience.

By avoiding the

first person singular voice, Lawrence never enters into

direct dialogue with his audience, and by making
authoritative third person assertions, he maintains this

distance.

Further his deGeptive use of "we!" in the first

essay does not create authentic union with his readers, but

creates instead a pseudo union and a pseudo consensus.

Birkin behaves in a similar fashion in his dialogues

with Utsula.

He expounds his theories as established fact,

more interested in gaining her agreement than in considering
her views.

Although she probed him thrdughout their

discussions, an authentic exchangei does not occur between
them, as Birkin continually presses his view and maintains
his separateness from Ursula.

Lawrence behaves similarly in Psychoanalysis where he

expounds his theories in third person assertions apart from
his audience.

Like Birkin, Lawrence is convinced of the

validity of his theories, seeking only consensus rather than
genuine dialogue.

However, Lawrence does create an

imaginary union between himself and his readers and,

ultimately, a feigned consensus through his rhetorically
deceptive use of "we" in the first essay.

In his second essay Lawrence comes closer to achieving
authentic union with an audience as well as the possibility
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of genuine; consensils.

He achieves this by entering into a

dialogue with his readers through his first person singular

vgice^ ^nd his

assertions that carry the rhetorical

potential of uniting his readets with him and to his^ theory.
Although Lawrence is more conspicuous in his defensive,

mocking tone ih response to critics, his first person

singular ;engagement in Fantasia makes him a visible speaker'
who can be reckoned with, thus creating more authentic union
than in Psychoanalysis where Lawrence never becomes a live

voice with whom an audience can engage, but remains
invisible and distant.

This didactic, distancing stance

often taken by Lawrence has given credence to the charge by
many that he wrote and thought from a solipsistic point of
^view.;

.

Not directed to the essays specifically, but to
Lawrence as a nonfiction writer in general, Ellis and Mills

cite commentaries by Lawrence's contemporaries reflecting
this widely held position.

Jessie Chambers made the charge

that "[as] an artist, when he is dealing with the immediate

and concrete, he is superb, but when he assays to be a

thinker I find him superficial and unconvincing, and quite
soon boring" (2, Chambers quoted in Ellis and Mills).
"[And] Rebecca West's pronouncement . . . that what he wrote
was true ^only of the universe within his own soul'"

reflects the "alleged solipsism" often countered against
Lawrence (3, West quoted in Ellis and Mills).

102

Most biting

is T. S. Eiiot's commonly quoted, smug indictment that
Lawrence had "an incapacity for what we ordinarily call

thinking"''^ (3, Eliot quoted in Ellis and Mills). In
contrast, F. R. Leavis has hailed Lawrence as a writer and

as a thinker in what he himself identifies as "a long battle

to win recognition for Lawrence, and to kill the currency of
the grosser misconceptions and prejudices." (Novelist,
intro., ix). ' '

"

Whether reviewing Lawrence's fiction or nonfiction, the

multitude of commentaries bear a common thread:
responding to Lawrence's ideas.

opposing responses:

they are

And these ideas have evoked

"His detractors have accused him of

stupid emotionalism, obsession with sex, anti-

intellectualism; his supporters say he was truer to feeling
than reason can be, treated sex as a religious activity,
denied the mind its right to inhibit" (Miko 3).

Critics

have responded to Lawrence's thoughts as either the mark of

a madman or the mark of a sheer genius, even a demigod.
F.R. Leavis has been the prototype for proponents of

Lawrencian thought, while T. S. Eliot has exemplified the
opposition.

However, at either extreme and in between, most

critical response has evaluated Lawrence's views in and of

themselves rather than the ways in which he expresses them.
In addition such critical responses have privileged his

fiction over his nonfiction, only considering the latter as
a means of understanding the ideas that develop in his

narratives.

Eliis^s coitimentaries cited in the introduction

to this study are worth considering again:

[Critics] have been happy enough to pillage both
psychology books for resounding summaries of
Lawrence's *beliefs' but, considering how much has
now been written on him, they have provided
comparatively little appraisal of their character or
worth and not much discussion of their relation to

his other writings.: (Ellis.
By moving beyond this limited view of Lawrence's

psychology essays, first by tracing the rhetorical

development of their ideas from WIL to the essays

themselves, thus establishing WIL as the primary site of

origin for the essays' ideas, and then by tracing the
rhetorical development within the essays themselves, as well
as the rhetorical progression that occurs from

Psychoanalysis to Fantasia, this study has examined the

rhetorical implications of the essays' strategical pronoun
selection and placement.

Ultimately, when examining these essays, to seize the
ideas expressed by Lawrence and to wrestle with them as his

rhetoric tempts readers to do is not enough.

Only by

examining Lawrence's rhetoric and by moving beyond the ideas
themselves to an examination of their varying modes of
presentation, can we discover how his rhetoric evokes such

powerful and opposing responses from critics.
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Chapter Four
Artist - Thinker - Theorist

The purpose of this study has been twofold:

(1) to

reverse the prevailing critical use of Lawrence's nonfiction

texts, specifically the psychdiogy essaysy^^^ a windows which
permit us to see into his fiction and (2) to dispute
Lawrence's ciaim in iFahtasia's foreword that his theory of
the unconscious and union evolved undeliberately and
separately from his fiction.

Clearly WIL's dialogues,

narrative explication, structure, and diction show that

Lawrence was consciously and purposefully developing his
psychology theory in the novel.

The novel does indeed

represent Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness."

Examination of WIL's narration and dialogue has shown the
beginnings of a struggle in this novel that was to be fully
articulated later in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.
Lawrence's theories did not simply come "unwatched out of

[his] pen"; they were not simply "inferences made

afterwards, from the experience," from his fiction^^
(Fantasia 15).
Lawrence had developed his idea that an artist's

philosopy comes "unwatched out of [his] pen" long before
writing his foreword to Fantasia.

In Studies in Classical

American Literature (both in the first version, written

while he was writing WIL, and in the final version.
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completed at the same time he was completing the psychology
essays), Lawrence articulated his vision of authentic art:

But art-speech . . . is . . . the greatest

universal language . . . Art-speech is also a
language of pure symbols. But whereas the authorized
symbol stands always for a thought or an idea, some
mental concept, the art-symbol or art-term stands for
a pure experience, emotional and passional, spiritual
and perceptual, all at once. i . . Art-speech is a
use of symbols whiqh are jpulsations on the blood
. . . (The Symbolic Meaning 18-19, early version,
Lawrence's emphasis)
The essential function of art is moral. . . .

But a passionate, implicit morality, not

didactic.

A morality which changes the blood, rather

than the mind. Changes the blood first. The mind
follows later, in the wake. (SCALTSO, later
version)

The artist usually sets out - or used to - to

point a moral and adorii a tale. The taie, however,
points the other way, as a rule. Two blankly
opposing morals, the artist's and the tale's.

trust the artist.

Trust the tale.

Wever

The proper

function of a critic is to save the tale from the

artist who created it.

(SCAL 8, later version,

emphasis added)

Lawrence's claim for a morality that changes the blood
first and the mind later represents his vision of art both
for the artist as well as for the critic-reader.

First,

Lawrence believed that the morality of the novel would be
expressed through the artist, in spite of the artist's

didactic intentions.

He believed that "art speech"—the

only medium of truth—never came from the artist, but from
the tale.

Further, he believed that "art speech" had the

capacity to change the blood, not simply the mind, of the
reader, again in spite of the artist's didactic intentions.
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However, by following Lawrence'sadmoniton to "never

trust the artist" but to "[trust] the tale," this

examination of WIL has shown that Lawrence's thebries 4^^
not come "unwatched out of [his}

w^

he was writing

the novel, nor were his theories simply "inferences made
afterwards" in the essays.

Instead it is noW clear that

Lawrence's theories were consciously articulated conceptions
that began to take form in WIL some time before the essays
were written.

the wake":

Lawrence's "mind" :did not follow "later, in

Lawrence was actively and consciously developing

his theory while writing the novel.

This study has been an

effort "to save the [theory] from the [tale]" rather than an
effort "to save the tale from the artist."

Any survey of Lawrence's writing, both his fiction and
nonfiction texts, clearly attests to Lawrence's
preoccupation with individual development through

relationships—with the human dilemma of realizing intimacy
with another while at the same time preserving one's
individuality.

From his earliest writings, Lawrence

explores this conflict between the self and others.

But now

it can be argued that it is not until WIL and the psychology

essays that he begins specifically and consciously to
examine this dilemma in theoretical terms.

N

Before WIL Lawrence does explore relationships in his

narratives, but never before WIL does he so specifically
examine the reasons for failed relationships, nor does he
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attempt to propose a formula for a successful relationship.

In earlier narratives, Lawrence explores the problems of
relationships and the internal struggles of his characters
through narration and dialogue.

However, these earlier

characters do not discuss their relationships amongst
themselves in an effort to define an ideal relationship as
Ursula and Birkin do, nor do the earlier narrators

articulate Lawrence's theory of the unconscious and union as
WIL's narrator does.

In Lawrence's earlier tales, enough is

offered via narration and dialogue to aid readers in
concluding why a particular relationship has failed, but
there are no claims made for a relationship based on
Lawrence's notion of "star-equilibrium."

Nothing in the

earlier fiction begins to resemble a theory of the
unconscious and union as Lawrence theorizes in WIL or in

Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.

By the time he writes WIL, Lawrence has moved beyond a
novel of experience into a novel of exploration, wherein he
begins to formulate his ideas about individual development

via union with another.

In WIL he offers a thoughtful

examination of relationships through his opposing couples:

Gerald and Gudrun's union represents the failure of an allconsuming fusion that destroys individuality, whereas Ursula

and Birkin's union suggests a possible solution to the
dilemma—"star-equilibrium"—the maintaining of "pure
singleness" through union with the other.

This purposeful

study of Gerald and GurdrunVs fa

and Ursula

and Birkin|s potentially^ successful relationshijj represents
Lawrence's first attempt to theorize in his fiction.

Not only in his narratives did Lawrence explore the

conflict between individual development and relationships.
Lawrence was preoccupied with this paradox throughout his

writings, and these ideas began to emerge in his earlier

nonfiction texts, prior to WIL and prior to Psychoanalysis

and Fantasia.^^ Particularly noteworthy is Studies in
Classical American Literature in which Lawrence did more

than just assert his theory of art and review significant

American artists.

In the earliest version of this study,

written at the same time he was writing WIL, kernels of
Lawrence's theory of the unconscious and union appear,

kernels that were to be more fully expressed later in WIL
and elucidated even further in the psychology essays.

Amin Arnold points out that, in addition to critiguing
American literature, Lawrence also attempted "to jot down
reflections about his solar-plexus-theories" (The Symbolic
Meaning 5-6).

Lawrence began sketching out the unconscious

and union in the earliest version of SCAL:

"Our knowing is

always secondary and subsequent to our being. . . ."
(Symbolic 26); "Our ultimate attainment is in ''beings"—
"pure reality lies . . . in the mystery of the perfect

unique self" (Symbolic 49, Lawrence's emphasis); "Love is
the mysterious force" that can lead to either "creative

conjunction" or "frictional disruption" (Symbolic 118); and

in "The Two Principles" (an essay that never appeared in
SCAL•s final 1923 version), such terms as "duality,"
"polarity," "blood consciousness," "otherness,"

"sympathetic" and "voluntary" appear (Symbolic 186-189).

Arnold explains Lawrence's approach in these early versions:
Lawrence had originally planned to write purely
literary essays which he would be able to use as

lectures in America. But, as always with Lawrence,
he had to write about the problems which occupied him
most at the moment.

And what really was on his mind

in 1917-1918 was his "philosophy". [sic] (Symbolic
4-5)

--V ^

These early musings emerge intermittently only in
relationship to a particular artist or a particular work
that Lawrence is reviewing.

They are not central to

Lawrence•s discussion as they are in WIL and the psychology
essays.

This contrast between SCAL, WIL and finally the

essays shows Lawrence's more deliberate and concerted effort

to shape his ideas into a theoretical framework through the
articulation of Birkin and the narrator in WIL and

eventually through his own voice in Psychoanalysis and
Fantasia.

In addition to reviewing Lawrence•s own texts for this

study, a survey of the critical canon has shown a preference
for considering Lawrence's fiction as the core of Lawrence's

ideas. The nonfiction texts, especially the psychology
essays, are generally given secondary status and mentioned

only in passing to explicate the meaning and significance of

his narratives.

On the other hand, critics such as Hinz, Ellis and

Mills, and Vickery have cohsidered the essays as artistic

expressions in and of themselves—especially as expressions
of Lawrence's art of persuasion.
the,essays are isolated.

However, in these studies

These critics take a narrow

approach to Lawrence's rhetorical style and structure by not
considering how the essays relate to the fiction.

Other

studies, such as Diane Bonds' and Daniel Schneider's,
consider the essays from a particular point of view:

Bonds

in her linguistic evaluation of the texts and Schneider in

his consideration of Lawrence's own psychology theories in
terms of the thinkers who influenced them.

Besides reversing the order usually taken by critics,
thus showing that Lawrence's WIL wa,s a prelude to

Psychoanalysis and Fantasia, this study has been an attempt
to create a marriage between earlier critics who used the

essays only as "a tissue of ideas" (Bonds 3) for the novels

and those later critics who viewed the ©ssays more
specifically as a separate prose genre, one in which the

linguistic signs of Lawrencian thought operate solely as a
means of rhetorical persuasion.

While such studies have

value in and of themselves for particular aspects of

Lawrencian rhetoric, Lawrence's writing and his thoughts as
a whole are more complex than any one study can reveal.

By

considering the theories of unconscious and union as well as
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their rhetorical expression, both in his fiction and his

nonfiction, the reader/critic can understand more clearly
the developing theory from one genre to the other and see
more clearly Lawrence's evolving dialogue within himself as

well as with his audience.

It is never enough to explore

simply what Lawrence had to say, in order to agree or
disagree with him.

It is instead part of the critical task

to examine how what-is—being-said has been said.

Lawrence

was acutely conscious of how he presented his ideas—his

rhetoric, his voice, his tone, his style—and reader/critics
fail to acknowledge his craft as a writer if they do not
examine and appreciate how he presented his thoughts in
print.

The essays' poor contemporay reception and the limited

attention that subsequent scholars have given them
(considering them only as aids to comment on Lawrence's

fiction) reflect the prevailing preference for fiction as
the superior form of discourse.

This condescending attitude

may also reveal these readers' uneasiness with Lawrence's

multiple voices in the essays, his often sarcastic attitude

towards his audience, and his esoteric, almost mythological
presentation of his ideas.

Paradoxically, these are the

very components that make the essays worth studying.

To

limit critical attention and give priority to the fiction
not only overlooks the richness of rhetorical play in these

nonfiction pieces, but moreover, overlooks their beginnings
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in the novel. The psychology essays are not afterthoughts
to the novels; they have evolved through time from their
beginnings in the fiction.

Women in Love is the site where

Lawrence began consciously to formulate his theory of the
unconscious and union.

In P/omen in Love Lawrence began his

"struggle for verbal consciousness" that would finally be
realized fully in Psychoanalysis arid Fantasia.
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Notes

^ I have used -the Cambridge UP edition ot Women in Lov^^
for all quotations and have not altered, nor noted, the
alternate British spelling.

This is but one example in which Gerald and Gudrun's

dialogue foreshadows Gerald's impending doom and their

failed relationship as well as contrasting Ursula and
Birkin's dialogue--another way the reader can see how the

opposing couples illustrate and build Lawrence's theory.
Also see the "Water-Party" Chapter, p. 177 and the "Snow
Chapter, p. 408.

^ "The deadly action-reaction syndrome seems a
characteristic of Birkin's linguistic attempt to taboo the
word ^love• and start from scratch with a new concept and
word to replace it. . . . Language seems like . . . a cul

de-sac out of which Birkin cannot escape in naming how he
wants to be beyond love, love remains the central principle"
(Ragussis 178).

^ To reinforce Birkin's inital statement of theory and
to extend the dialogue between Ursula and Birkin, Lawrence

uses the encounter between Birkin's Mino and a female stray

as a metaphor for Birkin and Ursula's relationship and
Lawrence's theory of human relationships.
The notion of conjunction and opposition are
expressed in WIL, first by Birkin's "two single equal stars
balanced in conjunction" (151) and then by the narrator's
description of Gerald and Gudrun:

"He seemed to balance her

perfectly in opposition to himself" (329) and "their being
balanced in separation, in the boat" (177).

Birkin's "in

conjunction" implies a union, whereas the narrator's "in

opposition" implies alienation, not equilibrium.

^ It is important to note that in "Man to Man" (as well
as elsewhere in the novel) Birkin also strives to define an

intimate relationship between man and man, specifically
between himself and Gerald Critch.

However a full

discussion of Birkin's quest is not germane to this study
except to point out that the same criteria hold whether

Birkin (or Lawrence) is discussing a relationship between
male and female or between male and male. (Also see
prologue to WIL, Phoenix II.)
There is some irony at play here in Lawrence's sexual
rhetoric.

In an effort to elevate the sexual encounter to a

spiritual plane, Lawrence uses phrases-—"comes out," a
"flower opened," "died a little death," "come to her," and

"his throw"— that do double duty as orgasmic references.
In Fantasia's ch. 3 and Psychoanalysis' ch. 4,
Lawrence extends his discussion of the body centers and

their roles through the mother and infant relationship, our
primary introduction into the world of relationships.

^ "When he makes love to Gudrun, however he does not
achieve connection with her.

He uses her for his ^relief'

and becomes like a child * soothed and restored'. . . . For

[Gudrun] has not given herself up, and she can only envy and
feel jealous hatred for Gerald, given peace in childlike
unconsciousness" (Schneider 184-185).
10

In WIL's "Class-Room" Chapter, Birkin makes this

same contrast between the authentic unconscious (Lawrence's)
and Freud's mentally derived unconscious (considered to be
artificial by Lawrence): "There's the whole difference in
the world . . . between the actual sensual being, and the

vicious mental-deliberate profligacy our lot goes in for. .
. . You've got to learn not-to-be, before you can come into
being" (WIL 94).
11

•
•
Within
the essay itself Lawrence alludes perhaps
defensively to his own digressions, i.e., pp. 46 & 102.

The point made by both Hinz and Mills regarding the
chronology of the essays is significant and worth noting.
The placement of Fantasia before Psychoanalysis in one book
may be misleading to readers, since Psychoanalysis was
written before Fantasia.

To note their difference, the

essays need to be read and considered in the order that
Lawrence actually wrote them.

Both essays are filled with examples of this

hedging, i.e. Fantasia, p. 20: In spite of his strong claim
that the unconscious begins at the moment of fusion,

Lawrence claims not to know where he comes from, repeatedly
claiming ignorance of his origin; and in Psychoanalysis, p.
212, after claiming that the "true unconscious" is the

"spontaneous life motive," Lawrence says that "life is
inconceivable"—it can't be defined.

Less obtrusive in Psychoanalysis is the distancing
indefinite pronoun "one" that WIL's narrator sometimes
intermingles with his "we" assertions. The indefinite "one"
is more conducive to non-fiction discourse than in WIL where

the "one" creates a distancing by the narrator and a
didactic tone that does not flow with the narrative
experience.
15

•
Ellis
also explains that Lawrence borrowed phrases
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from the reviews, parroting them in his "Foreword":

"a

revplting mass of wordy nonsense" and "pollyanalytics," for
example (72 & 85).
^

L

his esoteric ideas is

reflected in the "Pompadour" Chapter of WIL when Birkin's

iettets are mimicked and ridiguled by; others: "[Those]

phrases are too absurdly wonderful. . . . they're nearly as
good as Jesus" (383) and "He is a megalomaniac . . . it is a
form of religious mania.
(384).
::, ■ ./

He thinks he is the savior of man"
'

"His fiction provided him, he said, with the living
data, the passional experience, from which his ^subjective
science' was deduced.

But if he deduced his laws of

psychology from life, ^life' as it appears in his fiction is
seen always through the lens of these laws" (Schneider,
preface, p. x).

i.e., see The Study of Thomas Hardy and "The Crown"
written and completed during 1914-1915.

"[There] is an attitude of intellectual superiority
involved in presuming that Lawrence's interests and ideas
can be understood apart from his so-called 'eccentric habits
of language'" (Bonds 4).
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